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3.1  Introduction 
During the past  15 years, the labor market prospects facing less edu- 
cated young workers in the United States have seriously deteriorated as 
part of a dramatic trend toward widening wage inequality. For example, 
Katz and Murphy (1992) find that real wages  fell by 15.8 percent for young 
men with  less than a high  school education from  1979 to 1987, and a 
recent study by Burtless (1 994) similarly documents the deteriorating wage 
prospects of young women with limited education. Perhaps as a result of 
their falling real wages, young, less educated men and women  have also 
experienced  decreasing  labor  market  attachment  relative  to their more 
highly educated counterparts.' 
In contrast to the poor and declining prospects of many, especially less 
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educated U.S. youths, young workers in Germany appear to be well pre- 
pared  for the labor market  and to have better labor market  outcomes. 
German youths  typically have lower relative unemployment  rates than 
youths in  the United  States. For example, in  1989, at a time when the 
overall unemployment rate in Germany was 8.0 percent, it was 8.1 percent 
among 15-20-year-olds  and 7.4 percent among 20-30-year-olds.  In con- 
trast, in the United States, where the overall rate was 5.3 percent in that 
year, it was  15 percent  for  16-19-year-olds,  8.6 percent for 20-24-year- 
olds, and 5.7 percent for 25-29-year-olds  (Abraham and Houseman 1995, 
400; ILO 1993, 653; USBLS 1990, 162). Further, the low-skilled in  Ger- 
many  were  spared  the  declining  relative  and  absolute  real  wages  that 
afflicted those in the United States and several other OECD countries in 
the 1980s: wage inequality in  Germany was stable to declining, and real 
wages of the low-skilled in particular rose. The relative earnings of young 
workers were also stable to rising over the 1980s (OECD 1993a; Abraham 
and Houseman 1995). Thus young workers and the low-skilled in general 
had better labor market outcomes over the 1980s in Germany than in the 
United States. This difference in labor market performance suggests that 
the United States may have much to learn from Germany’s relative success. 
In this paper, we  examine differences between the United  States and 
West  Germany  in  employment  outcomes  of  young  workers  over  the 
1984-91  period. In light  of the employment problems of less educated 
youth in the United  States, we place special emphasis on how those at 
relatively low educational levels fared in the labor market. We  especially 
focus on less educated young women. Given recent U.S. welfare reform 
legislation, this group will be increasingly dependent on their own employ- 
ment and earnings prospects. We use nationally representative databases 
for each country, which allow us to measure young workers’ employment 
outcomes and also permit comparisons across age groups: principally the 
German Socioeconomic Panel for Germany and the Current Population 
Survey for the United States. 
German society is structured in several ways to ensure relatively good 
outcomes  for  those at  the bottom. For example,  the vast  majority  of 
youths  participate  in  Germany’s  vocational  training  system,  although 
women do not participate to the same extent as men. In the United States, 
no corresponding training system on a large scale imparts skills to workers 
at the lower end of the educational distribution. However, not everyone 
in Germany completes an apprenticeship. In this paper, we  emphasize a 
comparison  of German youths who are left out of that system with  a 
group in the United States who are also left out-high  school dropouts. 
Even for the group of Germans who drop out of the apprentice training 
system, institutions  exist to improve labor market outcomes. First, the 
German educational system appears to provide better basic skills than the 
American system at the bottom of  the distribution of academic achieve- Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  109 
ment. Second, German wage-setting institutions disproportionately raise 
the wages of the low-skilled. The U.S. labor market is largely nonunion, 
while wages in Germany are set in  industry-wide contracts that are ex- 
tended by  law to (or in almost all cases imitated by) the nonunion sector. 
In addition, the U.S. minimum wage is low by international standards and 
has generally been declining in real terms since the late 1970s (Minimum 
pay 1992). Thus we expect German wage-setting institutions to dispropor- 
tionately raise the pay of young, less educated workers. However, there 
may be negative employment effects of this system, and we will attempt to 
determine whether  this is the case. If  such effects exist, they  should be 
strongest for unskilled youths in general and young women in particular, 
since they are the ones most likely to be affected by  wage floors. Third, 
Germany has a larger public sector than the United States, and govern- 
ment employment can be a mechanism for reducing potential adverse em- 
ployment effects of administered wages (see Edin and Tope1 1997; Bjork- 
lund and Freeman  1997; Kahn 1998). We will  investigate this possibility 
as well. 
For women, while wage floors are expected to have demand-side effects 
on relative employment, public policy toward the support of children and 
maternity and parental leave may have supply-side effects.’ For example, 
maternity and parental leave policies in Germany are considerably more 
generous than those in the United States, and became even more so over 
the late 1980s. While relatively short leaves are likely to increase women’s 
labor force attachment, extended leaves may arguably do the opposite. 
And German schools do not provide lunch for students, forcing families 
to provide lunch at home; this feature of German society is also likely to 
reduce women’s labor force attachment because mothers are usually the 
ones responsible for arranging lunch for children. In earlier work we in- 
deed found higher labor force participation rates for U.S. than for German 
women (Blau and Kahn 1995). On the other hand, the U.S. welfare system 
places a particularly strong penalty on work for low-income, single moth- 
ers, implying possible negative employment effects for low-skilled women. 
Below we will attempt to shed light on the impact of the U.S. welfare sys- 
tem on young, hard-to-employ women. 
We find that less educated youths do indeed fare considerably better in 
Germany, experiencing both higher employment rates and higher relative 
earnings than is the case in the United States. Both these differences are 
particularly pronounced for women. While welfare may play a role, our 
findings suggest that it accounts for very little of the US.-German differ- 
ence in employment rates. It is also the case that the German women’s 
2. Of course, high wage floors can attract potential workers into the labor force in search 
of good jobs. In contrast, low and freely falling real wages for the less skilled may have led 
many US.  workers to leave the labor force. See Mincer (1976) and Juhn (1992). 110  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
employment advantage exists despite Germany’s more generous maternity 
and parental leave policies, which our results suggest do negatively affect 
German women’s employment rates, especially their full-time employment 
rates, all else equal. This suggests that low and declining real wages are 
likely an important explanation for the lower labor force attachment  of 
both young men and women in the United States. The relatively high em- 
ployment rates of less educated German youths combined with their rela- 
tively high wages raise the question of how they are successfully absorbed 
into the labor market. Our findings suggest that the public sector in Ger- 
many in effect functioned as an employer of last resort during this period, 
absorbing some otherwise unemployable low-skilled youths. 
3.2  Overview of West German and US. Labor Market 
Conditions and Institutions in the 1980s 
3.2.1  Training and Wage-Setting Institutions 
In designing policies to help young workers in the United States, ana- 
lysts have looked  increasingly to several aspects of the German educa- 
tional system and its labor market institutions for guidance, including its 
basic  formal  secondary  schooling  system,  its  apprentice  training  pro- 
grams, and its wage-setting mechanisms. First, its basic educational sys- 
tem has been found to produce a superior level of  learning, particularly 
for those at the bottom of the ability distribution (Nickell and Bell 1996). 
For example, on international mathematics tests for 13-year-old students, 
young Germans outscored young Americans at both the top and the bot- 
tom of the distribution. Thus, in particular  for those  at the bottom of 
the distribution of math ability, Germany produces a more highly trained 
potential labor force. 
Second,  Germany’s  apprentice  training  system,  which  many  believe 
greatly facilitates the school-to-work transition there, is often held up as 
an example for the United States to emulate (Buechtemann, Schupp, and 
Soloff 1993). Following secondary education in Germany, students typi- 
cally locate themselves on one of two tracks: (1) higher education-uni- 
versities and four-year technical colleges; or (2) one- to four-year full-time 
vocational schools and the “dual system” consisting of apprentice training 
and part-time  attendance  at vocational  schools  coordinated  with  firm- 
based training.) This arrangement  is a partnership  among government, 
training schools, and firms in which  the transition  from postsecondary 
education  (vocational  schools) to employment is  enhanced. These pro- 
grams have been credited with reducing youth unemployment,  and as we 
3. This description  of  Germany’s training  institutions is based on  Buechtemann  et al. 
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have  seen, relative unemployment  rates  for German youths are indeed 
lower than those for U.S. youths (see also Buechtemann et al. 1993). 
Finally, Germany’s system of centrally determined industry wage bar- 
gains with contract extensions to nonunion workers has been shown to 
raise the pay of low-skilled workers disproportionately (Blau and Kahn 
1996a). It is possible that  German wage-setting institutions  allowed its 
wage distribution to resist the effects of changing supply and demand con- 
ditions in the  1980s and to remain  stable, in contrast  to the widening 
U.S. di~tribution.~ 
These latter two aspects of the German labor market-its  elaborate sys- 
tem of  apprentice training and its union-negotiated industry-wide wage 
minima-resemble  the kinds of policies advocated by  Robert Reich, for- 
mer U.S. secretary of labor, who in 1995 called for an expansion of invest- 
ment in  education  and skills, a rise in the federal minimum wage, and 
changes in U.S. labor law to make it easier for unions to achieve recogni- 
tion (Bureau of National Affairs 1995a, 1995b). 
While participation in some form of postsecondary education or train- 
ing is near universal in Germany, about 21 percent of German youths had 
not attained a training certificate or postsecondary education degree 12 
years after leaving secondary school (Buechtemann et al.  1993, 8). It is 
these youths whom we categorize as “hard to employ” and who are the 
focus of  this paper. A potential drawback to the German labor market 
setup, particularly for hard-to-employ youths, concerns the possible dis- 
employment  effects of administered  wages. While in the United States, 
minimum wages have generally been found to have small or no employ- 
ment  effect^,^ several studies have found evidence consistent with the exis- 
tence of disemployment effects of high wage floors in Europe, although 
this finding is not unanimous.6 
While we  expect wage floors to reduce the relative employment of the 
low-skilled, an alternative response is for the government to act as em- 
ployer of last resort, as argued by Bjorklund and Freeman (1997) for the 
case of Sweden. They show that the share of all unskilled workers who 
were employed by the government rose during a period of severe wage 
4. However, Abraham and Houseman (1995) find that while growth in the supply of highly 
educated workers decelerated in the 1980s in the United States, in Germany this growth rate 
appeared stable. Thus it is possible that some of the stability in the German wage distribution 
in the 1980s reflects more stable growth in the supply of highly trained workers there. 
5. Card and Krueger (1995) find that minimum wages did not have negative employment 
effects for teenagers, while Neumark and Wascher (1992) find relatively small negative effects. 
Larger negative effects have been obtained by  Deere, Murphy, and Welch (1995). 
6. These include Edin and Topel (1997), Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower (1995), Abowd 
et al. (chap. 11 in this volume), Blau and Kahn (1996a), and Kahn (1998).  However, Card, 
Kramarz, and Lemieux (1995) find no evidence that inflexible relative wages in France over 
the 1982-89  period led to larger employment losses among low-wage workers there than in 
the United States. And Machin and Manning (1994) find that minimum wages in the United 
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compression induced by Sweden’s solidarity wage policy. Others have also 
found  evidence  of  such  government  employment  responses,  including 
Edin and Tope1 (1997) for Sweden and Kahn (1998) for Norway. In light 
of possible public employment responses, we  also examine this outcome 
below. Data in Nickel1 (1997) show that relative spending on active labor 
market policies during the 1989-94 period was about eight times as high 
in Germany as in the United States (this was defined as spending per un- 
employed person as a percentage of GDP  per member of the labor force). 
To the extent that such policies are disproportionately directed at youths 
and provide public sector jobs, they may help to account for the relative 
success of German youths. We also note that such employment responses 
by the government need not solely reflect explicit policies. Rather, the pat- 
tern of government employment may be such that, for whatever reason, it 
has the effect of absorbing otherwise unemployable youths. 
3.2.2  Gender and Labor Market Success: 
Germany versus the United States 
The gender wage gap among employed workers was lower in West Ger- 
many than in the United States in  1979, when American women’s wages 
were 60 percent of men’s compared to 71 percent in West Germany. But 
by  199  1,  the gender ratio was virtually the same, about 74 percent in both 
countries, and by  1994, the ratio  was actually somewhat higher  in  the 
United States (76.4 percent) than in West Germany (74.2 percent).’ Amer- 
ican women have considerably higher labor force participation rates than 
German women, especially among married women, and are more likely 
to  work full time. They are also less occupationally segregated and outearn 
a larger percentage of men than their German counterparts, implying that 
U.S. women have higher relative qualifications or enjoy more favorable 
treatment by employers than German women (Blau and Kahn 1995). 
It is possible  that Germany’s more generous maternity  and parental 
leave policies play a role in producing these differences in women’s labor 
market attachment. Provisions for parental leave in West Germany, ac- 
cording to the 1979 amendments to the Maternity Protection Act, call for 
14 weeks of fully paid maternity leave, of which two months are manda- 
tory, and protection of job security during pregnancy and through the end 
of the fourth month  after childbirth. Beginning in  January  1986, a  12- 
month parental leave with a paid allowance was additionally mandated 
(ILO 1988; Demleitner 1992). In 1990, the German parental leave provi- 
sion was expanded to 18 months, and in 1992, which is outside our sample 
period, it was increased even further to three years. Moreover, German 
7. See Blau and Kahn (1995), ILO (1993, 1995), and USBLS (1992,1995). Figures for 1991 
and 1994 are for average hourly earnings of nonagricultural employees in West Germany and 
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parental leave is paid as long as the parent taking the leave works no more 
than  19 hours per week, a provision encouraging part-time work. This is 
almost always the mother, as roughly 99 percent of people taking parental 
leave as of 1992 were women (Demleitner 1992).8  In contrast, there was no 
mandated parental leave policy in the United States prior to the passage of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993, which requires up to 12 weeks 
of unpaid parental leave for women or men. However, prior to the passage 
of the act it was (and continues to be) required that pregnancy be treated 
the same as any other medical disability by  the firm. Thus leave for the 
physical aspects of childbearing must be covered under a firm’s medical 
disability plan, if it has one. And in the late 1980s, roughly 40 percent of 
employees of large and medium-size establishments worked at firms that 
voluntarily granted some kind of parental leave beyond this, 92 percent of 
them unpaid (Hyland 1990). While there was some provision for parental 
leave in  the United States prior  to the  1993 legislation, it is  clear  that 
parental leave policies were considerably more generous in Germany. 
The impact of parental leave on women’s labor force attachment is un- 
clear a priori. On the one hand, by  guaranteeing women’s right to return 
to their jobs after pregnancy, parental leave may strengthen their labor 
force attachment. On the other hand, such policies, particularly if  they 
are generously paid and of long duration, could increase the incidence or 
duration of workforce withdrawals associated with pregnancy. It is pos- 
sible that by  1991 Germany’s relatively generous parental leave policies- 
18 months of partially paid parental leave after  14 weeks of fully paid 
maternity  leave-encouraged  labor  force  withdrawals  among  mothers 
of young children relative to the United States. In addition, the 19-hour 
provision  unambiguously  encouraged part-time work  among employed 
women. Moreover, throughout our period, it was legal in Germany for em- 
ployers to deny job offers to pregnant women (Demleitner 1992,246). Fi- 
nally, as noted earlier schoolchildren are sent home for lunch in Germany, 
making the family (usually the mother) responsible for arranging this meal 
(OECD 1988, 142). Each of these special features of the German labor 
market may be expected to discourage labor force attachment by women 
and, most particularly, full-time employment. 
In addition to parental and maternity leave policies that likely reduce 
the incidence of employment or full-time employment  among women, 
Germany maintains a system of child allowances. This is a universal sys- 
tem with increasing benefits paid to families with larger numbers of chil- 
dren. While the child allowance is less generous for high-income families, 
8. In fact, fathers had to get special permission to take family leave. Since firms bear some 
of the direct costs of the paid leave, it has been argued that they have an incentive to discrimi- 
nate against women in hiring (Demleitner 1992). The 19-hour provision was part of the origi- 
nal legislation that went into effect in January 1986 (ILO 1988, 103-4). 114  Francine D.  Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
it is available whether or not one works (U.S. Social Security Administra- 
tion 1995). In contrast, in the United States, there were direct cash benefits 
paid only to low-income families with children, through the Aid to Fami- 
lies with  Dependent  Children  (AFDC) program,  as it  was called  until 
1996. This program  paid  benefits  almost  exclusively to female-headed, 
low-income families and greatly penalized work among recipients by  re- 
ducing benefits virtually dollar for dollar with increased earnings. Welfare 
has been  found to have  only moderate effects on labor  supply  in  the 
United States (Moffitt 1992), but to the extent that it does have a negative 
effect, we would predict that it would disproportionately affect low-skilled, 
unmarried women with children in the United States9 
3.3  Data 
Our data sources for examining gender differences in young workers' 
labor market outcomes are principally the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) and the March Current Population Survey (CPS).l0 The CPS 
has the advantages of large sample size and, like the GSOEP, coverage 
of all individuals.  However, unlike the GSOEP, the CPS does not have 
information  on actual labor market experience, a factor that has been 
found to be important in explaining the gender pay gap (Mincer and Pola- 
chek 1974; O'Neill and Polachek  1993; Blau and Kahn 1997). Because of 
this omission, we  also perform  some examination of actual experience 
using the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)." However, 
the PSID contains labor market information only on household heads and 
spouses, thus excluding those who are living in the homes of their parents 
or of other relatives. This is of particular concern in a study of youths. 
Moreover, as discussed below, actual experience is not available for new 
9. In addition, the U.S. income tax system in effect rewards larger families through  the 
personal exemption, which allows the family to exclude from taxable income a given amount 
of money ($2,550 as of 1996) per person in the family. This system is similar to the German 
universal system (at least among U.S. taxpayers), but the AFDC program for the United 
States with its work disincentives for low-income individuals was significantly different from 
the German system. AFDC was replaced in 1996 with a reformed welfare system that has 
strict limits on the duration of benefits. We  expect the new system to encourage labor force 
participation and note that in the period  we  examine in this paper,  1984-91,  the AFDC 
system was in place. Working in the opposite direction during our period was the expansion 
of the earned income tax credit starting in  1987, which worked to increase the participation 
rate of single mothers, all else equal (Eissa and Liebman 1996). 
10. See Burkhauser (1991) for a detailed description of  the GSOEP and Katz and Murphy 
(1992) for a discussion of  the CPS. 
11. The PSID is a nationally representative survey and is structured very similarly to the 
GSOEP; see Blau and Kahn (1997) for a description. In addition to the nationally represen- 
tative portion of the sample, the PSID collected data on an oversample of those living in 
high-poverty areas. We  used these data as well in order to have larger samples of hard-to- 
employ youths and applied the PSID's sampling weights in  our analyses of these data to 
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members of the GSOEP after 1984. Thus we focus on analyses comparing 
the CPS and the GSOEP. 
We use the 1984 wave of the GSOEP because it has the largest sample 
size, is not affected by  attrition, and is the only one for which we  can 
compute actual labor market experience for all respondents. It is a nation- 
ally representative sample of the population living in West Germany, in- 
cluding West Berlin, in that year. In our main analyses, we use data only 
on Germans from the GSOEP, since education and training information 
is less detailed for immigrants.”  However, we  also present some findings 
for immigrants that suggest focusing on Germans gives an accurate pic- 
ture of the labor market for less skilled youths in this country. We define 
“young” as aged 18-29, a relatively inclusive definition. We do this in part 
for reasons of sample size and in part because, in Germany, schooling and 
formal training usually continue into the middle to late twenties (Buech- 
temann et a]. 1993). By  extending our age cutoff to 29, we  thus increase 
the chances of observing the school-to-work transition. 
In view of the important  changes in  the labor market in the United 
States and other countries in the 198Os, and because we  wish to observe 
what happens to young workers as they mature, we also examine the 1991 
GSOEP and CPS. In examining what  happens to young individuals as 
they age, we rely primarily on “synthetic cohorts.” That is, we compare a 
random sample of 18-29-year-olds  in 1984 to a random sample of 25-36- 
year-olds in  1991 to make inferences about what happened to people as 
they aged over the 1984-91 period. While it is possible to  construct panels 
of individuals in the GSOEP (and of course the PSID), and we do so in a 
supplementary analysis, one loses about 45 percent of the GSOEP panel 
through attrition and the sample sizes become too small for meaningful 
analysis. Similarly, while it is possible to construct a 1991 sample with in- 
formation  on actual experience  by  following the  original  1984 sample 
members, the small sample size problem precludes this. 
A final data issue relates to employment. We use two measures of em- 
ployment: the probability of being employed and the probability of being 
employed full time (both relative to the population). The measure of em- 
ployment  refers to current (survey week) employment status. Full-time 
employment  corresponds to usual  weekly  hours  for  the currently em- 
ployed of 35 or more in the preceding year (United States) or on the cur- 
rent job (Germany). We examine both variables because the latter gives 
additional information regarding the extent of labor force attachment. 
Some data issues arise in defining “employment” in the presence of pa- 
12. In particular, the GSOEP does not include detailed information  on basic schooling 
obtained outside Germany for immigrants. The survey asks whether the respondent earned a 
“degree,” but it does not specify what kind of degree. There is better information on whether 
immigrants completed postsecondary training outside (or inside) Germany and whether they 
earned German basic school degrees, information we use below. 116  Francine D.  Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
rental  leaves. Neither the CPS nor the 1984 GSOEP separately identify 
such individuals. In the CPS, individuals on parental leave are considered 
employed (“with a job but not at work”; Klerman and Leibowitz 1997). 
The same likely applies to the 1984 GSOEP. Only the 1991 German data 
give the option of separately identifying individuals on “maternity leave.” 
One question this raises is what is meant by “maternity leave.” Since we 
found that a relatively high proportion of young women fell into this cate- 
gory, we assumed that this meant both maternity and parental 1ea~e.l~  A 
second question relates to how this category should be treated. Since our 
interest is in  actual work, we  chose to exclude individuals  on maternity 
leave from the employed category. This raises some compatibility  issues 
with the CPS, as well as the 1984 GSOEP. However, it may be recalled 
that only 14 weeks of maternity leave were mandated in Germany in 1984 
and there  were no mandates in  place  in the United  States at this time. 
Thus the inclusion of women who were on leave as employed is likely to 
have had relatively little effect compared to the situation in Germany in 
1991, when an additional  18 months of parental leave had become avail- 
able. In terms of possible effects on our results, had we included women 
out on maternity  leave in  1991 as employed, the German employment 
advantage that we find for less educated German women would have been 
still larger. On the other hand, the larger negative effect on employment 
of children that we estimate for German women in 1991 compared to 1984 
would have been reduced. 
3.4  U.S.-German Differences in Labor Market 
Preparedness and Outcomes of Youths 
3.4.1  Education 
Our major focus is on gender differences in the labor market for hard- 
to-employ youths in West Germany and the United States. Since, in each 
country, the less educated are the hardest to employ, comparing the two 
countries requires a standardized definition of education. For the United 
States, a measure of years of formal schooling completed is readily avail- 
able in  the  CPS  and PSID data sets. However, since classroom,  voca- 
tionally related training  is far more important in Germany than in the 
United States, it would be desirable to take into account both academic 
and vocational schooling in creating a comparable years of schooling mea- 
sure for Germany. Krueger and Pischke (1995) have created a mapping 
from  the  GSOEP’s  educational  and training  measures  into a  years  of 
school variable, and we use their scheme here. 
13. The following proportions of young women (aged 18-29)  were in this category: ,037 
(low-education group), ,089 (middle-education group), and .087 (high-education group). See 
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Based on German and U.S. measures of years of schooling, we create 
three educational  groups for each country that encompass roughly  the 
same proportions  of the nonenrolled  population  and thus account for 
differences between the two countries in average years of schooling com- 
pleted: Edlow, Edmid, and Edhigh, respectively, referring to groups with 
low, middle, and high education. For the United States, the groups are 
Edlow, less than 12 years; Edmid, 12-15  years; and Edhigh,  16 or more 
years.  For  Germany,  the groups are Edlow, 9-10  years;  Edmid,  11-12 
years; and Edhigh, over 12 years.14 
We  chose educational  groups according to categories instead of, say, 
quartiles of the distribution of educational attainment, for several reasons. 
First, we believe that for both countries, the Edlow category corresponds 
to an identifiable group made up of the hard to employ. In West Germany, 
individuals in that category had completed at most only basic secondary 
education  and had no formal degree from  a high  school (gymnasium), 
university, college, or any vocational school. This group is outside the sys- 
tem of formal certification. In the United States, those in the Edlow cate- 
gory have less than a high school education, which surely places them at 
great risk of severe difficulties in the labor market. Second, because the 
distribution of years of schooling is lumpy, it is not possible to construct 
categories that correspond exactly to particular percentiles of the popula- 
tion, such as the middle two quartiles. For example, among American men 
aged  18-29  who were not in school, 48 percent had exactly 12 years of 
schooling in 1984 (CPS tabulation). Third, looking ahead to table 3.2, we 
see that among those not currently in school, the percentages of the 18-29- 
year-old population in the three educational categories as we have defined 
them are quite similar for the United States and Germany. Thus, for our 
target group, the educational categories we have created in fact correspond 
roughly to a breakdown by distribution percentiles. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide evidence on educational participation  and 
attainment by  age-gender group. Several findings emerge that provide a 
picture of the relative labor market preparedness of men and women in 
each country. In table  3.1,  we  focus on current school attendance. The 
German data allow people with jobs to also report that they are in school, 
while the CPS asks respondents to state their “major activity.” Thus, in 
the CPS, only those who say their major activity is school are reported as 
being in school. In contrast, in the U.S. Census of Population, people are 
asked if they are currently enrolled in school, whether or not employment 
is their major activity. Since it is possible for one to be employed and in 
14. For Germany, we include those with an Abitur degree only (it., with no postsecondary 
schooling) in the middle-education group even though Krueger and Pischke (1995) code an 
Abitur as requiring 13 years of schooling. Our decision was based on our impression that 
these people, who made up only about  1 percent of the sample, were more similar in their 
employment experience to the middle- than to the high-education group. Because the group 
is so small, this coding did not affect our results. Table 3.1  Educational Participation and Attainment 
Country 
Ages 18-29  Ages 25-36 
Proportion  Years of School  Sample  Proportion  Years of  School  Sample 
in  School  Completed  Size  in School  Completed  Size 
~  ~  ~~ 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men 
1991  Men 
Women 
Women 
United States (CPS) 
1984  Men 
1991  Men 
Women 
Women 
United States (PUMSP 












1  I .60 
11  56 
1 I .67 







































aPUMS  is the Census of Population Public Use Microdata Sample 1/100 sample. Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  119 
school at the same time, we also report in table 3.1 U.S. figures for school 
enrollment using the 1990 Census of Population (PUMS) information. 
Using either the CPS or the PUMS definition, among both 18-29-  and 
25-36-year-olds,  German men are more likely than American men to be 
in scho01.I~  The differences are substantial. For example, in the younger 
group, the most likely to be in school, over two-fifths of German men were 
in school in each year, compared to 29 percent of American men in 1990 
(PUMS). For women in the census data-that  is, using a definition of be- 
ing in school comparable to that in Germany-  18-29-year-olds are slightly 
less likely than Germans to be in school (29 percent in the United States 
for  1990 and 32 percent  in Germany in  1991). However, among 25-36- 
year-olds, American women are more likely than Germans to be in school 
(1 1.1 vs. 6.5 percent). 
Among young men and women, aged 18-29,  gender differences in years 
of schooling completed are small in both countries in each year. However, 
using either the CPS or the PUMS as the American comparison group, 
women  are about equally likely as men to be currently in school in the 
United  States  but  substantially less likely than men  to be  currently  in 
school in Germany. The German gender gap in current school attendance 
implies that educational attainment differentials will increase as a cohort 
ages and finishes its schooling. This effect can be seen in table 3.1 by not- 
ing that among 25-36-year-olds  in Germany in  1991, the gender gap in 
years of schooling was 0.46, while among 18-29-year-olds  in  1984 (Le., 
the same cohort seven years earlier), it was only 0.04 years. In contrast, in 
the United  States, there was  a  negligible gender  difference  in  years  of 
school completed  for men and women aged  18-29  in  1984, and this re- 
mained true as the cohort aged. 
Table 3.2 explores educational  attainment  in more detail, focusing on 
those currently not in school. This population  is the focus of our subse- 
quent  analyses.  We  again  note that in  both  Germany  and the  United 
States, gender differences in years of school among 18-29-year-olds  are 
small. However, in Germany, they widen with age, and in the full popula- 
tion (aged 18-65),  women are considerably more likely than men to be in 
the low-education  group and considerably  less likely to be in the high- 
education group. Gender differences in educational attainment are small 
in all age groups in the United States, with the major difference in the full 
population being women’s lesser likelihood of being in the high-education 
group and their greater likelihood of being in the middle group. 
There is some evidence of  an increase in women’s relative educational 
attainment  among recent cohorts in both countries.  As may be  seen in 
table 3.2, the gender gap in years of school completed for 25-36-year-olds 
15. The longer period of German than American schooling has been noted by Buechte- 
mann et al. (1993). 120  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.2  Educational Attainment for Individuals Currently Not in School 
Proportion in Category 
Years of School  Sample 
Country  Completed  Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh  Size 
A. Ages 18-29 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men 
1991  Men 
Women 
Women 
United States (CPS) 
1984  Men 











































B. Ages 25-36 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men 
1991  Men 
Women 
Women 
United States (CPS) 
1984  Men 











































C. Ages 18-65 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men  12.15  .112  ,632  .256  2,971 
Women  11.10  ,344  ,540  ,115  3,267 
1991  Men  12.36  ,117  ,599  .285  2,246 
Women  11.50  ,274  ,578  ,148  2,425 
1984  Men  12.52  ,222  ,561  ,216  44,531 
Women  12.24  ,216  ,630  ,154  48,427 
1991  Men  12.75  ,188  .578  ,234  43,645 
Women  12.60  ,180  ,626  ,193  47,177 
United States (CPS) 
and 18-65-year-olds in Germany was slightly smaller in 1991 than in 1984. 
And the gender gap in the incidence of Edlow among 18-65-year-olds fell 
from about 23 percentage points in 1984 to 16 percentage points in 1991  .I6 
16. In table 3.2, the incidence of  Edlow in Germany among  18-29-year-old  men not in 
school actually rose between 1984 and 1991, from .122 to ,185, while that  for women fell 
from .209 to ,187. These changes may reflect an improvement in the job market for young 
men over the 1980s. As noted above, male youth unemployment in Germany declined both 
absolutely and relatively over the 1980s (Abraham and Houseman  1995,400). Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  121 
However, among 18-29-year-olds in Germany, the gender gap in current 
school attendance was about the same in 1991 as in  1984, and the gender 
gap in school attendance among 25-36-year-olds in Germany was actually 
a bit larger in 1991 than in 1984 (table 3.1). These differences in school en- 
rollment suggest that there will continue to be a gender gap in completed 
schooling among mature adults in Germany in the future. In the United 
States, the gender gap in schooling completed was never large and appears 
to be even smaller for newer cohorts (actually favoring women  among 
18-29-year-olds). Particularly notable is the rise in women’s relative inci- 
dence of college graduation.” An implication of these findings is that the 
target group of this study, less educated youths, is one in which German, 
but not American, women are overrepresented. 
3.4.2  Employment 
Our goal in this paper is to compare how well less educated youths fare 
in the German and American labor markets and to attempt to provide 
some explanations for differences across the two countries. To do this we 
examine the employment and earnings of workers by age, education, and 
gender, beginning with the incidence of employment. The most striking 
pattern evident in the raw comparisons shown in table 3.3 and figure 3.1 
is the relatively low employment rate of young, less educated Americans, 
particularly women, in  comparison to their  German counterparts.I8 In 
1984, the employment rate of  18-29-year-old women in the Edlow group 
was only 35 percent in the United States, and their full-time employment 
rate (i.e., percentage of the out-of-school population with full-time jobs) 
only 21 percent, in comparison to rates of 55 and 43 percent, respectively, 
in Germany. This difference continued to hold in 1991 when the employ- 
ment and full-time rates for this group were 38 percent and 23 percent in 
the United States compared to 57 and 42 percent in Germany. Young, less 
educated American men were also less likely to be employed or employed 
full time than  Germans, particularly  in  1991 but  also in  1984. Similar, 
although  smaller  differences  prevail  for  men  in  the  middle-education 
group. 
The differences between the United States and Germany for young, less 
educated wom-en are particularly noteworthy, since among the other edu- 
cational groups, young Americans tend to be at least as employable and 
often more so than Germans. And among the less educated population as 
a whole (Edlow for 18-65-year-olds), Americans fared much better than 
among youths. For example, in table 3.3, we see that among the full low- 
education  group (aged  18-65),  American women are about as likely as 
German women to be employed and actually more likely to be employed 
17. In addition, relative female enrollment in marketable degree programs in law, business, 
and medicine increased in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s (Blau and Kahn 1997). 
18. This pattern was also found in the PSID. Table 3.3  Employment Measures by Selected Age and Educational Group 
Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh 
Country  Employed  Full Time  Employed  Full Time  Employed  Full Time 
A. Ages 18-29 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men 
1991  Men 
Women 
Women 
United States (CPS) 
1984  Men 




1984  Men 











































































B. Ages 25-36 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men  ,824  ,689  ,948  ,883  ,960  ,771 
Women  ,412  ,209  ,589  .342  ,675  ,448 
1991  Men  ,910  355  ,966  ,927  .974  .928 
Women  ,602  ,291  ,657  ,318  .663  ,482 United States (CPS) 
1984  Men 




1984  Men 



















































C. Ages 18-65 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men 
1991  Men 
Women 
Women 
United States (CPS) 
1984  Men 




1984  Men 
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Fig. 3.1  Employment rates by  education, ages 18-29 
Note: A,  Low education; B, middle education; C,  high education. 
full time, in a major contrast to the 18-29-year-olds.  And while less edu- 
cated German men aged 18-65 had higher employment rates than Ameri- 
cans, the German-US. differences were generally smaller than for youths. 
Thus, in an absolute and a relative sense, the low employment rates of less 
educated young people in the United  States compared to Germany are 
particularly notable. Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  125 
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Fig. 3.1  (cont.) 
Table 3.4 provides some evidence on the progress of the 18-29-year-old 
cohort over the 1984-91 period.19 Focusing on the less educated, the table 
shows that employment-population  ratios rose  for  men  and women  in 
both countries with age, with the largest increases for German men. Sig- 
nificantly, however, by  the time its members reached  their late twenties 
and early thirties (ages 25-36),  the 1984 German youth cohort of less edu- 
cated men and women remained considerably more likely to be employed 
than those in the United States. The same conclusions for full-time jobs 
hold for men. However, in all educational groups, including the least edu- 
cated,  German women’s  full-time  attachment  fell  dramatically  as they 
aged. By  1991, less educated German women  were no more likely than 
Americans to have full-time jobs. In the other educational groups, Ameri- 
can women either caught up to and surpassed German women or added 
to their  1984 lead in employment incidence and especially  in their  full- 
time employment  rates. In contrast, American men in  the middle-  and 
high-education  groups fell behind Germans in employment  (but not as 
far as the Edlow group did) and had a mixed  set of outcomes for full- 
time employment. 
Overall, the synthetic cohort analysis shows  that at least  during  the 
1984-91  period,  the employment  disadvantage  faced  by  less educated 
young men and women  in America  compared to Germany was not re- 
versed  with  age. The one  exception  was  that  due  to a  strong general 
19. Note that in this synthetic cohort analysis, the members of, say, the low-education 
group in 1984 are compared with those who remained in that educational category in 1991. Table 3.4  Employment Measures by Educational Group for Synthetic Cohort Aged 18-29  in  1984 
Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh 
Country  Employed  Full Time  Employed  Full Time  Employed  Full Time 
~~~  ______  - 
Germany (GSOEP) 
1984  Men  ,750  ,684  ,900  ,803  ,905  .762 
Women  ,553  ,427  ,664  .575  .782  ,618 
1991  Men  ,910  ,855  ,966  ,927  ,974  ,928 
Women  ,602  ,291  ,651  .378  .663  .482 
1984  Men  ,687  ,545  ,855  ,686  ,936  ,806 
Women  ,353  ,210  ,678  ,472  ,867  .704 
1991  Men  ,743  ,674  ,886  ,841  ,958  ,914 
Women  ,419  ,290  ,710  ,543  ,838  .693 
1984  Men  .9 I6  ,797  ,950  ,854  1.034  I .058 
Women  ,638  ,492  1.02 1  ,821  1.109  1.139 
1991  Men  ,816  ,788  ,917  ,907  ,984  ,985 
Women  ,696  .997  I081  I .437  1.264  1.438 
United States (CPS) 
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pattern of declining full-time employment rates with age among German 
women in all educational categories, the less educated American women’s 
full-time rate equaled that of German women by 1991. This equality, how- 
ever, stands in marked contrast to the considerably higher rates of full- 
time  employment  for  American  compared  to German  women  in  the 
middle- and high-education categories and thus still indicates considerable 
relative disadvantage for less educated American women. 
The stronger association  of education  (particularly  Edlow)  with em- 
ployment or full-time employment for American youths than for German 
youths shown in tables 3.3 and 3.4 holds up in probit analyses when we 
control for age, age squared, marital status, presence of children, and, for 
the United States, a race indicator.  The point estimates and asymptotic 
standard errors are presented in  appendix tables 3A.1  and 3A.2. Table 
3A.3 calculates the estimated effects of education based on these results, 
both as partial derivatives of the employment probability with respect to 
education  and as semielasticities  (the derivative  divided  by  the mean). 
Both absolutely and relative to the mean, we find that educational differ- 
ences play a stronger role in leading to differences in employment oppor- 
tunities  or willingness to work  in the United  States than is the case in 
Germany. 
So far we  have analyzed labor market attachment solely by examining 
whether  or not one is currently employed  or employed  full time. Table 
3.5 takes a closer look at the workforce attachment of young workers by 
considering patterns of actual experience for panels of workers for whom 
experience during the 1984-91  period was observable. Recall that in the 
GSOEP, experience is collected only  as of  1984. For the original panel 
members who remain, experience after 1984 can be computed. However, 
we cannot observe experience for those who join the GSOEP after 1984. 
For comparability, we  construct  a similar panel of individuals from the 
PSID. Table 3.5 shows experience and full-time experience as of 1984 and 
199  1. It should also be noted that since experience is measured from age 
15 in the GSOEP and from age 18 in the PSID, the raw levels of experience 
are not directly comparable across countries. We can, however, compare 
relative levels of experience for educational groups. 
The results are quite consistent with what would be expected based on 
the employment  rates. For both men  and women, Americans  with  low 
levels of schooling have lower relative experience levels (compared to those 
with  middle  or high  levels of  education)  than those  in  Germany. The 
differences in amounts of experience across educational levels are partic- 
ularly  dramatic  for  young  American  women:  less  educated  American 
women had only 40 percent of the total or full-time experience of middle 
educated women in 1984, while less educated German women had  11 to 
18 percent  more experience  than middle educated women. These U.S.- 
German differences continue to be observed as the 18-29-year-old cohort Table 3.5  Years of Experience and Full-Time Experience by Educational Group for Individuals Aged 1%29 in 1984 
~ 
Edlow as of  1984  Edmid as of 1984  Edhigh as of  1984 
Work Experience  Germany  United States  Germany  United States  Germany  United States 
Total experience 
1984  Men 
Women 
1991  Men 
Women 
Full-time experience 
1984  Men 



















































Sources: Panels for 1984-91  from the German Socio-Economic Panel and Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Note: Includes only those out of school as of  1984. Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  129 
aged into 1991, although the cross-country differences decline somewhat. 
Among men, the low-education group in the United States has about 90 
percent of the total or full-time experience of the middle educated in each 
year, while in Germany the less educated men’s advantage ranges from 2 
to 20 percent  depending on the year and measure. Overall, the data on 
experience levels reinforce our conclusion that less educated young men 
and women in America have relatively low labor market attachment com- 
pared to their German counterparts. 
3.4.3  Earnings 
In this  section we  consider  the earnings  of youths.  Earnings are of 
course important in themselves as an indicator of economic well-being. In 
addition, an analysis of earnings may provide some evidence regarding the 
reasons for the lower labor market attachment of less educated American 
youths  detailed  above. For example,  if  these  workers have particularly 
poor labor market opportunities (Le., low wages), then movements along 
a supply curve would be a possible explanation for their low attachment 
to the labor force. 
To  analyze  wages,  we  focus  on  people  who  are not  currently  self- 
employed and who did not have any self-employment income during the 
previous year. In both the GSOEP and the CPS, it is possible to compute 
average monthly wage and salary income over the previous year, including 
wages and salaries, as well  as bonuses. Thus earnings for the 1984 and 
1991 samples refer to 1983 and 1990. Unfortunately, it is not possible in 
the GSOEP to calculate hourly earnings since we  lack information on 
weeks worked.  However, both data sets contain information  on hours 
worked per week. We  use this information  to simulate hours-corrected 
earnings as follows. Suppose that for each country and year we can express 
log monthly earnings of person i: 
(1) 
where Y is monthly labor income in 1983 U.S. dollars for both countries,20 
PART is a dummy variable for part-time workers (defined as working less 
than 35 hours per week), HRPARTand HRFULL are interactions of work 
hours with part-time and full-time employment, Xis a vector of explana- 
tory variables, and u is a disturbance term. The following variables are 
included in X. age and its square, marital status (Mar), presence of chil- 
dren (Childyes), educational dummies (Edlow and Edmid), and, for the 
United States, a race dummy variable for whites (White). For the reasons 
discussed above, we are forced to use age rather than actual experience in 
equation (1). We include controls for marital status and especially children 
Inr =  a,PAR7; + a2HRPARq + a,HRFULL, + EX,  + u,, 
20. This is obtained using the OECD’s (1996) index of  purchasing power parity (German 
marks per U.S. dollar) for 1983 and 1990 and the U.S. consumer price index as deflator. 130  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
to pick up some of the effects of workforce interruptions for women asso- 
ciated with these events (e.g., Waldfogel 1998). Equation (1) is estimated 
separately for men and women in each age group. 
(2)  InYFULL,  =  lnY, - u,PART - a,HRPART, 
We then simulate full-time earnings for each individual as follows: 
- a,(HRFULL, - 40). 
Equation (2) estimates what a worker’s monthly earnings would have been 
had he or she worked 40 hours per week.*’ 
Table 3.6 presents log real hours-corrected  monthly earnings in  1983 
U.S. dollars for both countries, by  age-gender-education  group for  1984 
and 1991; figure 3.2 highlights the results for young workers. We see the 
same pattern among men and women: German youths with low education 
levels outearned Americans. In 1984, the German advantage was 1  1 to 15 
percent and grew to 27 to 35 percent by  1991 (compare the first and sec- 
ond columns of table 3.6).22  In American purchasing power, real wages of 
less educated German youths rose 9 to 12 percent between 1984 and 1991, 
while they fell by 7 to 8 percent for American youths over this period. 
Although  American  youths  with  middle  levels  of  education  also  lost 
ground to inflation and relative to Germans, they remained closer to the 
German level of purchasing power in  1991 than American less educated 
workers. Finally, among highly educated youths, Americans started with 
a small advantage over Germans (1 to 5 percent) in 1984 that widened to 
20 to 22 percent by  1991. The changes in relative wages by  educational 
group for the labor force as a whole (ages 18-65) were similar to those for 
18-29-year-olds but less dramatic. The changes in the relative purchas- 
ing power of  high- and low-education groups illustrate the considerably 
greater widening of the American wage distribution in the 1980s compared 
to Germany (Abraham and Houseman  1995). 
Table 3.7 shows the progress in real wages within the cohort of 18-29- 
year-olds as it aged during the 1984-91 period. Real hours-corrected earn- 
ings rose for all gender-education groups in this cohort within Germany 
and the United States; however, by 1991 less educated Germans outearned 
Americans by  15 to 22 percent. American men’s real wages rose substan- 
tially less quickly than German men’s  among the low-education  group, 
while American less educated young women maintained their position at 
roughly  15 percent  lower purchasing-power-corrected  wages than  Ger- 
mans. In contrast, young, highly educated Americans experienced  very 
21. In earlier work on international differences on the gender gap in pay, we used a similar 
procedure since we lacked data on hourly earnings there as well; see Blau and Kahn (1995, 
1996b). 
22. The percentage differences  cited in the text are approximations based on the differences 
in the logs. Table 3.6  Log Real Hours-Corrected Earnings 
Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh  All 
Gender  1984  1991  1984  1991  1984  1991  1984  1991 
A. Ages 18-29 
Men 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.834  6.926  7.002  7.067  7.305  7.148  7.019  7.059 
United States (CPS)  6.724  6.652  7.020  6.940  7.316  7.347  7.020  6.963 
US-German difference  -0.110  -0.274  0.018  -0.127  0.01  1  0.199  0.001  -0.096 
Women 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.653  6.777  6.745  6.867  7.029  6.989  6.776  6.875 
United States (CPS)  6.504  6.423  6.768  6.752  7.075  7.213  6.801  6.820 
US.-German difference  -0.149  -0.354  0.023  -0.115  0.046  0.224  0.025  -0.055 
B. Ages 25-36 
Men 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.915  7.093  7.186  7.175  7.450  7.364  7.226  7.224 
United States (CPS)  6.979  6.869  7.306  7.230  7.545  7.571  7.333  7.268 
US.-German difference  0.064  -0.224  0.120  0.055  0.095  0.207  0. I07  0.044 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.805  6.709  6.955  6.978  7.195  7.223  6.978  6.993 
United States (CPS)  6.663  6.560  6.967  6.943  7.272  7.391  7.027  7.039 
US.-German difference  -0.142  -0.149  0.012  -0.035  0.077  0.168  0.049  0.046 
Women 
C. Ages 18-65 
Men 
Germany (GSOEP)  7.022  7.057  7.198  7.235  7.577  7.566  7.269  7.313 
United States (CPS)  7.047  6.938  7.301  7.266  7.668  7.709  7.339  7.326 
US.-German dilference  0.025  -0.1  19  0.103  0.031  0.091  0.143  0.070  0.013 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.751  6.810  6.921  6.968  7.261  7.303  6.925  6.992 
United States (CPS)  6.662  6.612  6.917  6.951  7.276  7.410  6.954  7.024 
U.S.-Germdn difference  -0.089  -0.198  -0.004  -0.017  0.015  0.107  0.029  0.032 
Women 
Note: Earnings are in  1983 U.S. purchasing-power-equivalent dollars 132  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
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Fig. 3.2  Log real hours-corrected earnings by education, ages 18-29 
Nute: A,  Low education; B, middle education; C, high education. 
large gains relative to the Germans. As was the case for employment, less 
educated American workers did not close the gap with Germans as they 
aged but rather continued  to do substantially worse than their German 
counterparts. 
The general findings suggested by the tabulations in tables 3.6 and 3.7 Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  133 
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Fig. 3.2  (cont.) 
Women 1984  Women 1991 
are confirmed by the education effects obtained in regression analyses con- 
trolling for age, age squared, marital status, presence of children, and, for 
the United States, race, in addition to the hours variables. These results, 
which are shown in table 3.8, indicate the greater importance of education 
in determining American than German wages and the increased impor- 
tance of education in the United  States relative to Germany over the 
1984-91  period. The rising returns to education in the United States occur 
both across cohorts over time and within the youth cohort as it ages from 
18-29  in 1984 to 25-36  in 1991. 
The gender gap in pay is explored in table 3.9, which shows male-female 
differences in the log of hours-corrected earnings by age-education group. 
Among the youth cohort overall, the gender pay gap was slightly smaller 
(by .024 to ,041 log points) in the United States than in Germany in both 
years and fell by similar amounts in both countries. However, for the low- 
education group, the American gender pay gap was larger than the Ger- 
man gap, by  .039 to .080 log points, reflecting the especially poor labor 
market position of less educated, young American ~0men.l~  As expected 
based  on published data and previous studies, for the labor force as a 
whole (ages 18-65, all), the gender pay gap was larger in the United States 
than in Germany in  1984 (by .041 log points), but by  1991, the German 
gap  was  a  bit  greater  (by  .019 log  points).  Interestingly,  within  each 
23. However, within the cohort that was 18-29  years old in 1984, the US.-German gender 
gap difference fell between 1984 and 1991 (from ,039 to -.075) for the less educated but rose 
for the other educational groups. Table 3.7  Log Real Hours-Corrected Earnings for Synthetic Cohort Aged 18-29  in 1984 
Gender 
Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh  All 
1984  1991  1984  1991  I984  1991  1984  1991 
Men 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.834  7.093  7.002  7.175  7.305  7.364  7.019  7.224 
United States (CPS)  6.124  6.869  7.020  7.230  7.316  7.571  7.020  7.268 
US.-German difference  -0.1  10  -0.224  0.018  0.055  0.01  1  0.207  0.001  0.044 
Germany (GSOEP)  6.653  6.709  6.745  6.978  7.029  7.223  6.776  6.993 
United States (CPS)  6.504  6.560  6.768  6.943  7.075  7.391  6.801  7.039 
US-German difference  -0.149  -0.149  0.023  -0.035  0.046  0.168  0.025  0.046 
Women 
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Table 3.8  Ceteris Paribus Effects of Education on Log Earnings 
Country 
1984 
Edlow  Edmid 
1991 
Edlow  Edmid 
A.  Ages 18-29 
Germany (GSOEP) 
Men  -.324 
(.070) 
(.083) 
Women  -  ,246 
United States (CPS) 
Men  -.423 
(.023) 
(.026) 









-.I  10 
(.077) 
-  ,098 
(.076) 






-  ,050 
(.056) 




B. Ages 25-36 
Germany (GSOEP) 
Men  -.SO6 
Women  -  .377 
(.057) 
(.083) 
United States (CPS) 
Men  -.558 
Women  -.584 
(.019) 









-  ,237 
(.060) 
(.089) 
-  ,463 









-  .429 
(.012) 
(.013) 
Note: Other explanatory variables include age, age squared, marital status (Mar), presence 
of  children  (Childyes),  PART, HRPAR7:  HRFULL, and, for  the  United  States,  a  race 
dummy (White). 
educational group, the American pay gap for all workers (ages 18-65)  was 
larger than the German pay gap in 1991, possibly reflecting a more egali- 
tarian German wage structure. The fact that not controlling for education, 
the overall gender pay gap was smaller in the United States than in Ger- 
many  reflects the superior relative educational  qualifications  of Ameri- 
can women. 
3.4.4  Patterns for Immigrants in Germany 
As we  noted earlier, the basic analyses for Germany in this paper are 
performed for German natives only, due to the lower quality of schooling 
information on immigrants. However, the GSOEP does provide some evi- 
dence on immigrants’ education, as well as on their family status and labor 
market outcomes. In this section, we explore the schooling, employment, 
and earnings of young immigrants in Germany, with a special focus on 
those without German technical  school, high  school, or postsecondary Table 3.9  Gender Gap in Log Real Hours-Corrected Earnings 
Country 
Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh  All 
1984  1991  1984  1991  1984  1991  1984  1991 
A. Ages 18-29 
Germany (GSOEP)  ,181  ,149  ,257  ,200  ,276  ,159  .243  ,184 
United States (CPS)  .220  ,229  ,252  ,188  ,241  ,134  .219  ,143 
US.-German difference  .039  .080  -  ,005  -.012  -  ,035  -.025  -  ,024  -.041 
B. Ages 25-36 
~~  ~  ~~  ~~~  ~  ~~  ~~~  ~  ~~~~~~  ~~~ 
Germany (GSOEP)  .I  10  ,384  .23  1  ,197  ,255  ,141  .248  .23  1 
United States (CPS)  ,316  ,309  ,339  ,287  ,273  ,180  ,306  .229 
U.S.-German difference  ,206  -  ,075  ,108  ,090  .018  ,039  ,058  -.002 
C. Ages  18-65 
Germany (GSOEP)  ,271  ,247  .277  ,267  ,316  ,263  ,344  ,321 
United States (CPS)  ,385  ,326  ,384  ,315  ,392  ,299  ,385  ,302 
US-German difference  ,114  .079  .I07  .048  ,076  ,036  ,041  -.019 Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  137 
degrees. We conclude that even if one were to include immigrants in what 
we  have termed the low-skilled group, young people without formal cre- 
dentials living in Germany would  still have employment and wage out- 
comes far superior to those of low-skilled young Americans. 
Appendix table 3A.4 contains schooling, employment, and wage infor- 
mation for young immigrants in Germany for  1984 and 1991. Panels A 
and B show that in comparison to natives, immigrants are less likely to be 
in school and less likely to have postsecondary training or German techni- 
cal or high school degrees (cf. tables 3.1 and 3.2 above). Thus, overall, 
immigrants tend to be a relatively low skilled group. Panel B examines 
employment and hours-corrected earnings for all young immigrants who 
are not in school. Overall, men are about as likely to be employed as Ger- 
man natives in the low-education group, while women are somewhat less 
likely to be employed than German natives; however, immigrant women 
are much more likely than low-skilled Americans to be employed. And 
German immigrants’ wages are about the same as those of German na- 
tives with low levels of education. 
If we  treat all immigrants,  regardless of their training, as competing 
with low-skilled native workers, then according to the GSOEP’s weights, 
immigrants would make up  only about 16 percent of the low-skilled popu- 
lation among individuals in Germany for 1984.24  Under this assumption, 
we  still conclude that young people with low skill levels (immigrants and 
natives aggregated) in Germany have much better employment and wage 
outcomes than Americans. However, panel B of table 3A.4 indicates that 
a considerable portion of the immigrant population had German school- 
ing that would place them in the middle- or high-education group by our 
definition. A sharper comparison between immigrants and natives may be 
drawn by examining lower skilled immigrants, as we now do. 
To focus on immigrants without German formal skills, we present labor 
market information on young immigrants without German technical, high 
school, or postsecondary degrees in panel C of table 3A.4. In panel D, we 
additionally exclude immigrants who have received vocational or univer- 
sity degrees from other countries. Our conclusions are the same in either 
case. We find the levels of male employment and wages to be quite similar 
to those for German low-skilled workers. However, while low-skilled im- 
migrant women’s wages are about the same as their native German coun- 
terparts,  their  employment  rates  are  considerably  lower  than  those  of 
24. The GSOEP immigrant files are an oversample of that population. While the GSOEP 
version we used had sampling weights for 1984, it did not include sampling weights for 1991, 
so we  cannot produce a similar figure for that year. But according to the OECD (1993b), 
foreign individuals made up 7.4 percent of the population in West Germany in  1984 and 8.2 
percent in 1990 (falling to 7.3 percent for eastern and western Germany combined for 1991). 
Thus our conclusions about the small relative size of the immigrant population in the youth 
labor market are likely to hold for 1991 as well. 138  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
natives. Young, low-skilled immigrant women in Germany are only a little 
more likely to be employed than low-skilled American young women in 
1984, and equally likely to be employed in  1991; full-time employment 
rates are somewhat higher for low-skilled immigrant women in Germany 
than for low-skilled Americans. Nonetheless,  since for  1984 immigrants 
without  German formal skills were only  11 to 13 percent  of  all young 
Germans without formal skills, our basic finding that young, low-skilled 
individuals in Germany have much more labor market  attachment than 
those in the United States would not be affected were we to include immi- 
grants. 
The finding that the hours-corrected earnings of low-skilled immigrants 
of both sexes are virtually  identical to those of German natives is quite 
consistent with the high  administered  wages in Germany. The fact that 
employment rates of less educated male immigrants are similar to those 
of natives suggests that they too do not pay a price in terms of employment 
for these relatively high wages. While the lower employment rates of less 
educated immigrant women could indicate an employment  cost of high 
wages for them, we  strongly suspect  much  of the immigrant-native  em- 
ployment  difference for women  in  Germany reflects cultural factors op- 
erating on the supply side. A substantial proportion of young immigrant 
women come from countries with relatively low female labor force partici- 
pation rates, including 45 percent from Turkey and an additional 38 per- 
cent from Italy, Greece, and Spain.25 
3.5  Explanations for the Low Labor Market Attachment 
of Less Educated American Youths 
As  we  have  seen,  real  wages  are  lower  for  less  educated  youth  in 
America  than in  Germany,  both absolutely  and relative  to their  more 
highly educated counterparts. Our wage findings are consistent  with the 
operation of high wage floors in Germany from which less educated em- 
ployed  youths disproportionately benefit.  The low labor market attach- 
ment of Americans may reflect movements along a supply curve in  re- 
sponse to these  lower  wages,  and below,  we  use  existing  estimates  of 
American labor supply elasticities to simulate the effect of raising Ameri- 
can wages to German levels. However, to  the extent that the higher relative 
wages of less educated German youths reflect high administered industry 
minimum  wages, we  would  expect to observe demand-induced employ- 
ment reductions in Germany. Yet  we  find that employment  rates of less 
25. All of these countries had a lower female-male labor force participation rate ratio than 
West Germany during the 1985-88  period (Blau and Ferber 1992, 300-304).  While 12 per- 
cent of young immigrant  women  came from Yugoslavia, which  had a female-male labor 
force participation rate  ratio slightly higher  than that in West  Germany for the 1985-88 
period, this  group is far outweighed  by  those from  countries for which  the ratio favors 
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educated youths are higher in Germany. This pattern is particularly strik- 
ing among young women, where Americans lag behind Germans substan- 
tially in  both wages and employment. At least two features of German 
and American  government  policy  may help to explain Germany’s  rela- 
tively high youth employment rates, which occur despite its system of rela- 
tively high, administered wages. 
First, Germany has a larger public sector, which can potentially absorb 
those who would otherwise be out of work. Second, the U.S. welfare sys- 
tem, for which less educated women  are most likely to qualify, strongly 
penalizes market work. We attempt to shed light on these possible expla- 
nations for German-U.S.  differences in employment  outcomes below. In 
addition, it is of interest that the lower employment rates of less educated 
U.S. women occur in the face of a countervailing factor that would work 
to reduce labor market attachment  among German women: Germany’s 
system of maternity and parental leave, which is considerably more gener- 
ous than that in the United States and was expanded between  1984 and 
1991. This could mean either  that German family leave does not have 
the expected negative effect or that other factors are sufficiently strong to 
outweigh its impact among less educated women. We also investigate this 
question below. 
3.5.1  Government Employment 
As several authors have argued, public employment can be an outlet for 
the labor supply induced by high wages. The descriptive results in table 
3.10, showing the fraction of workers in each gender-age-education group 
who are government workers in each country, are consistent with this ar- 
Table 3.10  Fraction of Employment in Government: Levels 
Edlow  Edmid  Edhigh 
United  United  United 
Year  Germany  States  Germany  States  Germany  States 
A. Ages 18-29 
1984  Men  .I58  .049  .I61  .077  ,208  ,167 
Women  ,218  .043  ,229  ,107  ,442  .276 
1991  Men  ,189  .027  .I88  ,114  .241  ,163 
Women  ,267  ,036  ,256  ,096  ,304  ,208 
B. Ages 30-65 
1984  Men  ,164  ,101  ,245  ,142  ,359  .258 
Women  ,236  ,104  ,235  ,184  ,561  ,453 
1991  Men  .I58  .073  ,242  .I45  .318  ,233 
Women  ,274  ,093  ,260  ,170  ,503  ,384 
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gument. Public employment is more extensive in Germany. While in both 
countries it is disproportionately taken by  the highly educated, the less 
educated appear to have greater representation in the public sector in Ger- 
many than in the United States. 
Table 3.1 1 subjects these impressions to greater scrutiny by comparing 
differences between the two countries in the incidence of public employ- 
ment by age-education group. For government employment to explain the 
higher employment  rates of less educated German youths, we  expect to 
find that low education is less of a barrier to public employment in Ger- 
many than in the United States. Further, we might expect this effect to be 
particularly  strong  for  young  workers,  who  are  potentially  the  most 
affected by wage floors, and to be strongest for young women, who are the 
lowest wage group. These expectations are at least partly  borne out by 
the data. 
Most significantly, the results in  table  3.1 1 strongly suggest that low 
education is less of a barrier to public employment  among less educated 
youths in Germany than in the United States: for each comparison (Edlow 
vs. Edmid and Edlow vs. Edhigh) and each year, the German-U.S. differ- 
ence is positive,  indicating that the treatment  of less educated youths is 
more favorable in Germany than in the United States. However, this favor- 
able effect does not tend to be larger for young women  than for young 
men. Among males, our additional expectation that low education is more 
of a barrier to public employment among older than among young work- 
ers within Germany is confirmed as well: the Edlow-Edmid  and Edlow- 
Edhigh differences by age group in panel C are larger for Germany than 
for the United States in all cases. This finding is consistent with a larger 
private  sector disemployment  effect of high  wage floors on young male 
workers that provide a stronger impetus for government employment. Our 
additional expectations are not, however, consistently borne out among 
women, Less educated, younger  workers  face lower barriers than older 
workers to obtaining government employment only in the Edlow-Edhigh 
comparisons. In addition, in only one case-the  1991 Edlow-Edhigh com- 
parison-is  the relative advantage of younger women larger in Germany 
than in  the United  States. It may  be  that older, less educated German 
women are also minimum wage constrained so that they may seek govern- 
ment employment. In any case, the data in table 3.11 support the notion 
that in  Germany the government  potentially plays an important role in 
providing jobs for less educated,  young workers  even  if  in  the case of 
women this effect is not necessarily greater than for older, less educated 
women.26  We may note that we are not necessarily arguing that this reflects 
26. These findings are largely confirmed when we  estimate the probability of  government 
employment as a function of educational group, age, age squared, marital status, presence 
of children, and, for the United States, a race indicator. The results are shown in appendix 
table 3A.5. Table 3.11  Fraction of Employment in Government: Differences 
Edlow vs. Edmid  Edlow vs. Edhigh 
Germany  United States  Germany-US.  Germany  United States  Germany-US. 
Divided  Divided  Divided  Divided  Divided  Divided 
Year  Absolute  by  Mean  Absolute  by  Mean  Absolute  by mean  Absolute  by  Mean  Absolute  by Mean  Absolute  by Mean 
A. Ages 18-29 
1984  Men  -.003  -.018  -.028  -.322  ,025  ,304  -.050  -.299  -.I18  -1.311  ,068  1.012 
Women  -.011  p.041  -.064  -.489  ,053  ,447  -.224  -.839  -.233  -1.779  .009  .940 
1991  Men  .oo  1  ,005  -.087  -.806  ,088  ,811  -.052  -.260  -.I36  -1.259  ,084  ,999 
Women  ,011  ,041  -.060  -.526  .07  I  ,568  -.037  -.139  -.I72  -1.509  ,135  1.370 
B. Ages 30-65 
1984  Men  -.081  -.340  -.041  -.246  -.040  -.095  -.I95  -.819  w.157  -.940  -.038  ,121 
Women  ,001  ,003  -.080  -.611  ,081  ,614  -.325  -1.042  -.349  -2.664  .024  1.622 
1991  Men  -.084  -.422  -.072  -.667  -.012  ,245  -.I60  -.804  -.I60  -1.481  ,000  ,677 
Women  .014  ,050  -.077  -.675  .09  I  .725  -.229  -.812  -.291  -2.553  ,062  1.741 
C.  Difference by  Age: (Ages 18-29) -  (Ages 30-65) 
~ 
1984  Men  .078  ,322  ,013  -.076  ,065  ,399  .I45  ,520  ,039  -.371  ,106  ,891 
1991  Men  ,085  ,427  -.015  -.I39  ,100  ,566  .I08  ,544  ,024  ,222  .084  .322 
Women  -.012  -.044  ,016  .I22  -.028  -.I67  ,101  ,203  ,116  ,885  -.015  -.683 
Women  -.003  -.008  ,017  .I49  -.020  -.I57  .I92  ,673  ,119  1.044  ,073  -.371 
Nofr: Includes only those out of school. “Mean” refers to the mean fraction employed by  government for the relevant age-gender group. 142  Francine D.  Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
an explicit government policy to function as an employer of last resort. It 
may simply be that, given the large size of the government sector and the 
composition of employment in it, these groups are more readily absorbed 
than in the United States. 
To  assess the potential size of  the effect of government employment in 
causing young, less educated Germans’ greater labor market attachment, 
we present table 3.12 showing the fraction of the population of less edu- 
cated  youths  having  government  jobs.  Among  both  young  men  and 
women, a much larger share of this population  has government jobs in 
Germany than in the United  States. Further, the percentage point gap 
between the two countries in this share (9 to 15 points for men and 11 to 
14 points for women) is large compared to the German-U.S. differences in 
employment-population ratios shown in table 3.3. These latter differences 
are about 20 percentage points for women and range from 6 to 20 points 
for men. Of course, each government job may not add a total of one net 
new job for the population,  but  the large differences between  the two 
countries shown in the table imply that government employment has a po- 
tentially important effect in increasing the employment rates of young, less 
educated Germans compared to their counterparts in the United States. 
As noted above, we found that young German men with low education 
especially  improved  their  relative economic  status  over the late  1980s. 
Their employment increased both absolutely and relative to young, low- 
skilled Americans, while their real earnings increased relative to less edu- 
cated youths in  the  United  States and more highly educated  German 
youths. Our results suggest that public sector employment played a role in 
this improvement. Table 3.12 shows a sharp increase in the fraction of the 
population of  young, less educated German men with government jobs 
(from 12 percent in 1984 to 17 percent in 1991). It is true that the Edlow- 
Edmid and Edlow-Edhigh comparisons for young German men in table 
3.11 indicate that there was no relative increase in the government employ- 
ment incidence of the less educated between 1984 and 1991. That is, less 
educated  German young men appear to have benefited from a general 
increase in  the incidence of government employment for young males in 
all educational groups. However, for the Edlow-Edmid  comparison, the 
Table 3.12  Fraction of the Population with Government Jobs for Ages 18-29  with 
Low Educational Levels 
Year  Germany  United States 
1984  Men  ,119  .034 
Women  ,121  .O  1 5 
1991  Men  ,170  .O 19 
Women  ,152  ,014 
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German-U.S. difference did increase in absolute value. This suggests that 
low education had an increasingly important effect in the United States 
relative to Germany in keeping young men out of government jobs over 
the 1984-91  period. Thus, in this relative sense, we can say that the govern- 
ment played a role in raising young, less educated men’s employment in 
Germany compared to that in the United States. 
The sharply higher real wages, labor market attachment, and incidence 
of  government  employment  among  young,  less  skilled  Germans than 
among Americans  are consistent  with  the following scenario. German 
unions negotiate high wage floors, having a relatively large positive effect 
on wages of the low skilled. The government in effect functions as an em- 
ployer of last resort and provides jobs for the additional workers looking 
for employment as a result of the higher wages, although this may or may 
not reflect an explicit government policy. The additional workers finding 
government jobs include those disemployed by the wage floors and those 
brought into the labor market by the prospect of high wages. An impor- 
tant question in interpreting our US.-German comparisons is the degree 
to which this scenario can account for the employment attachment differ- 
ences of less educated youths in the two countries. In particular,  given 
American labor supply elasticities, could German-level real wages, cou- 
pled with government jobs for those not able to find private sector work, 
entice enough Americans into the labor force to bring the employment- 
population ratio to the German level? 
In order to answer this question, we need estimates of the wage elasticity 
of labor force participation for young, low-skilled workers in the United 
States. The labor supply literature typically estimates the supply elasticity 
for total work hours (Killingsworth  1983); however, we have found some 
studies of the participation elasticity that would allow us to simulate the 
effects of raising Americans’ real wages. For women, Schultz (1980) finds 
for white married women in 1967 an elasticity of 1.5 for ages 14-24  and 1  .O 
for ages 25-34.  A second study by Kimmel (1996) obtains a participation 
elasticity of 1.5 for single mothers aged 18-55  in 1987. While these samples 
are not identical to our low-skilled group, 1.5 seems a reasonable estimate 
for the female elasticity for simulation purposes. For men, Juhn (1992) 
estimates the derivative of the employment probability  with  respect to 
wages as a step function that depends on one’s position in the wage distri- 
bution. For white men in the bottom 20 percent in 1970, a group compara- 
ble in relative size to our low-skilled group, she finds a derivative of .288. 
While Juhn (1992) does not report  an elasticity for this group, we  can 
approximate one by using as a base the employment-population ratio for 
white high school dropouts. When we  do this, we obtain an employment- 
population ratio elasticity of 0.3 for low-skilled men. 
For  young,  low-skilled  women,  table  3.6  shows that American  real 
wages were lower than those for Germany by .I5 log points in  1984 and 144  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
.36 in 1991. Applying the 1.5 elasticity to wage increases of this magnitude 
implies increases in the labor force participation rate of .079 in 1984 and 
.201 in 1991. These movements along the women’s supply curve constitute 
about 40 percent of the German-U.S. employment rate gap in  1984 and 
103 percent in 1991. However, these studies relate to labor force participa- 
tion rather than employment. While the GSOEP  did not collect unemploy- 
ment information in 1991, it is available for 1984, allowing us to calculate 
labor force participation rates for the earlier year. We find that the labor 
force participation gap between the United States and Germany is slightly 
smaller than the gap for the employment-population ratios so, at least for 
that year, the proportion explained would be roughly the same were we to 
focus on participation. 
For low-skilled young men, the U.S.-German real wage differences were 
.ll log points in  1984 and .27 in  1991. According to Juhn’s (1992) esti- 
mates, these wage increases would raise the American employment-popu- 
lation ratio by .023 in  1984 and .057  in  1991, or about 37 percent of the 
German-U.S. employment gap in 1984 and 28 percent in 1991.” 
These simulations of the effects of  equalizing German and U.S.  real 
wages among young workers with low educational levels imply that the 
high-wage, public employment demand response scenario could account 
for all of the German-U.S. difference in employment rates for low-skilled 
young women in  1991. But for young women in  1984 and young men in 
both years, something more is needed to explain higher employment rates 
among German low-skilled youths. 
One possible explanation for the remaining differences for young males 
and for young females in  1984 is that German youths have lower unem- 
ployment  rates than young Americans, and it is  likely that labor force 
participation depends on unemployment as well as wages. As just noted, 
the GSOEP allows us to compare U.S. and German unemployment rates 
for 1984, and we  find that less educated young men and women both have 
higher unemployment rates in the United States. For women, the unem- 
ployment rate was 11.8 percent in the United States and 10.0 percent in 
Germany, while for men it was 19.8 percent in the United States and 18.4 
percent in Germany. What are the labor supply implications of these un- 
employment rate gaps between  the United States and Germany? If the 
American unemployment rate were lowered to the German level for these 
workers and if the labor supply elasticity of the employment-population 
ratio with respect to the unemployment rate were .76 for men and  1.91 
for women, then labor supply responses to unemployment rate and wage 
differences could together account for all of the employment-population 
27. Since Juhn’s (1992) estimates are for employment (rather than for labor force participa- 
tion), applying elasticities based on her results to our employment-population ratios is ap- 
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ratio gap between young, less skilled Germans and Americans in  1984.28 
And the higher incidence of public employment in Germany would allow 
the greater labor supply there to result in actual employment. 
3.5.2  Welfare 
While we  have  seen that higher  government employment provides a 
plausible explanation for a substantial portion of the U.S.-German differ- 
ences in the employment rates of the low skilled, it is also possible that 
the U.S. welfare system plays a role. As we see in table 3.13, single mother- 
hood in the United States is highly negatively correlated with education. 
In 1984, for example, 33 percent of young US. women with low levels of 
education  were single mothers, compared to 20 percent in  the middle- 
education  group and only 6 percent in the high-education  group.29  The 
United  States also has a much  higher  incidence of single motherhood 
among women with low educational levels than is the case for Germany. 
In 1984, the German rate of single motherhood was about 10 percentage 
points lower than the US. rate in the low- and middle-education groups 
and about the same in the high-education group. Moreover, between 1984 
and  1991, the incidence of  single motherhood  in the United States in- 
creased by a bit more (4 percentage points) in the Edlow group than in 
the Edmid group (3 points) while actually declining slightly for women in 
the Edhigh group. In Germany, if anything, single motherhood appears to 
have diminished. The difference between the United States and Germany 
in female headship may itself be due in part to  AFDC in the United States, 
although research generally does not indicate a strong welfare effect on 
fertility or marital  status within  the  United States (Ellwood  and  Bane 
1985; Moffitt 1992). 
In addition to  possibly affecting family formation decisions (we attempt 
to assess the employment consequences of family structure below), the 
welfare  system  could  also  of  course  reduce  labor  market  attachment 
among recipients. Tables 3.14 and 3.15 shed light on this issue by examin- 
ing the employment rates of young women in each country by family com- 
position  and education. If the welfare system is important in reducing 
employment, we expect this impact to be primarily confined to those who 
28. These implied elasticities were computed as follows. Taking the case of men for illustra- 
tive purposes, we  note that wage differences between Germans and Americans account for 
2.3 percentage points of the 6.3 percentage point differential in the employment-population 
ratio. Thus unemployment  rate differences would have to account for the remaining 4.0, 
which would imply a 5.8 percent increase on the U.S. base employment-population ratio of 
68.7 percent. The American unemployment rate in  1984 for young, low-skilled men was 7.6 
percent higher than that for Germans (i.e., .198/.184). Thus the required American elasticity 
of the employment-population ratio with respect  to the unemployment rate is  5.W7.6,  or 
0.76. An analogous computation leads to a required elasticity for women of 1.9  1. 
29. The heavy concentration of single motherhood among less educated women  in the 
United States is particularly emphasized by Blau (1998). Table 3.13  Family Composition of Women Aged 18-29 
Marital Status  Children Present  No Children Present 
Not  Not  Not 
Country  Married  Married  Total  Married  Married  Total  Married  Married 
United States (CPS) 
1984  Edlow 
Edmid 
Edhigh 




1984  Edlow 
Edmid 
Edhigh 














.45  1 
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.524 Table 3.14  Employment by Family Composition and Education for Women Aged 18-29 Levels 
1984  1991 
Not Married  Married  Not Married  Married 
Without  With  Without  With  Without  With  Without  With 
Country  Children  Children  Children  Children  Children  Children  Children  Children 
United States (CPS) 
Employment-population ratio 
Edlow  ,526  ,308  ,455  ,303  ,526  .316  .468  ,335 
Edmid  ,842  ,645  ,791  ,508  ,846  ,660  ,842  ,578 
Edhigh  .957  3.56  398  ,642  ,949  ,885  ,923  ,670 
Edlow  .303  .I57  ,342  ,192  ,325  . I75  .333  ,220 
Edmid  .606  ,398  ,642  ,326  ,619  ,433  ,710  ,396 
Full-time employment-population ratio 
Edhigh  .796  ,649  ,756  ,457  ,793  ,679  .83  1  ,499 
Germany (GSOEP) 
Employment-population  ratio 
Edlow  ,643  ,667  ,875  ,339  350  ,476  n.a.  ,243 
Edmid  383  .787  ,856  ,321  .970  ,657  ,943  ,301 
Edhigh  ,887  n.a.  1.000  ,429  ,953  n.a.  ,958  .23  I 
Edlow  .619  ,545  ,750  ,136  ,800  ,286  n.a.  ,027 
Edmid  ,844  .745  ,833  . I33  .929  ,371  ,811  ,053 
Full-time employment-population ratio 
Edhigh  ,774  n.a.  ,826  .I43  ,860  n.a.  ,875  ,154 
Note: n.a. = cell size equal to 10 or fewer observations. Table 3.15  Employment by Family Composition and Education for Women Aged 1129: Differences 
1984  1991 
Not Married:  With Children:  Not Married:  With Children: 
With Children vs.  Not Married vs.  With Children vs.  Not Married vs. 
Without Children  Married  Without Children  Married 
Absolute  Divided  Absolute  Divided  Absolute  Divided  Absolute  Divided 
Country  Difference  by  Mean  Difference  by  Mean  Difference  by  Mean  Difference  by  Mean 
United States (CPS) 
Employment-population  ratio 
Edlow  -.218 
Edmid  -.I97 
Edlow-Edmid  -.021 
Edlow-Edhigh  -.I17 
Edlow  -.I46 
Edmid  -  ,208 
Edhigh  -.I47 
Edhigh  -.I01 
Full-time employment-population ratio 
Edlow-Edmid  .062 
Edlow-Edhigh  .oo  I 
Germany (GSOEP) 
Employment-population  ratio 
Edlow  ,024 
Edmid  -  ,096 
Edhigh  n.a. 
Edlow-Edmid  ,120 
Edlow  -  ,074 
Edmid  -  ,099 
Full-time employment-population ratio 
Edhigh  n.a. 
Edlow-Edmid  ,025 
-.618 
-  .29  I 
-.I  I6 











~  ,233 
-.210 
-.I86 
-  ,064 
-  ,024 
-.I46 
-  ,560 
-  ,258 
-  ,072 
-  ,302 










-  ,293 
-  ,695 
-.441 
-  ,209 
-  ,255 
-  ,486 














-  ,036 
-  ,647 
-.358 
-.I53 
-  .289 
-  .494 
~  ,045 
,037 
,180 























-  ,655 










-  ,295 
-.I73 















-  1.233 






-  ,059 




Norr: n.a. = cell size equal to 10 or fewer observations. “Mean” refers to the mean outcome for the relevant education group Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  149 
are eligible for benefits. By  and large, this group is limited to unmarried 
women with children, although in a very small number of cases, married 
couples with children can also qualify. Moreover, among this group of 
single mothers, the less educated are far more likely to qualify for welfare 
benefits and to find welfare an attractive option. These considerations sug- 
gest several possible comparisons that can yield evidence on the impor- 
tance of welfare. 
First,  among unmarried  women,  one can compare the employment 
rates of those with and without children. In the United States, the former 
can conceivably qualify for welfare benefits, while the latter cannot. Fur- 
ther, employment differences between these two groups can be contrasted 
for the less educated and those with middle or high educational levels, 
since less educated, single mothers are the most likely welfare recipients. 
And both these  comparisons  can be  contrasted  for  Germany  and the 
United States, since only the US.  welfare system has strong work disincen- 
tives built in. Second, among women with children, one can compare the 
employment rates of married and unmarried women. In Germany, neither 
group has an AFDC-like program available, while in the United States, 
again, single mothers can qualify. In either comparison, if less educated, 
single mothers in the United States stand out with especially low relative 
employment levels, then this would provide some evidence that welfare 
may have a role to play in explaining the lower employment  rates of at 
least some American women. 
The levels of the relevant variables are shown in table 3.14. We focus on 
table 3.15, which provides the type of comparisons discussed above. We 
focus on the employment-population ratio rather than work hours, since 
AFDC taxed  away  virtually  all earnings except for a  small exemption 
(Ehrenberg  and  Smith  1997). First,  looking  at  unmarried  American 
women, we  see that for each educational group, those with children are 
less likely to be employed than those without children. Further, the largest 
differences either in absolute value or (especially) relative to the mean of 
the educational group are for less educated American women. This is the 
case in both 1984 and 1991. In contrast, in Germany among less educated 
unmarried women in 1984, those with children actually are more likely to 
be employed than those without children, while the reverse is true among 
those with middle levels of education. In 1991, mothers are less likely to 
work among both less and middle educated women in Germany, but rela- 
tive to the mean, the contrasts between the Edlow and the Edmid groups 
are bigger in the United States than in Germany. This comparison between 
the German and the U.S. experience implies that welfare may play a role 
in lowering American women’s employment. This does not mean, however, 
that welfare necessarily explains a substantial portion of the U.S.-German 
difference. We attempt to shed light on the potential size of the effects of 
welfare below. 150  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Second, among those with children, the unmarried in the United States 
are as likely or more likely than married wdmen to be employed. Although 
it is the case that as education rises, unmarried women’s relative employ- 
ment levels compared to those who are married also rise, we find a similar 
result for Germany (when data are available). Thus this contrast between 
educational groups is not strong evidence of a welfare effect. Finally, we 
note that among less educated women with children, the unmarried are 
much more likely to  work than married women (by 23.3 to 32.8 percentage 
points) in Germany, while in the United States the married are about as 
likely to work as the unmarried. However, the German employment ad- 
vantage  for unmarried  women  with  children is even larger  among the 
middle-education group, so this comparison again does not provide evi- 
dence of a welfare effect. 
While tables 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 provide  some suggestive (although 
mixed) evidence that the U.S. welfare system plays a role in explaining 
U.S.-German differences in labor market attachment among the less edu- 
cated, how large an effect can it have? This issue is addressed in table 
3.16, which examines the impact of family structure. It shows what the 
employment and full-time employment rates among less educated young 
American women would be if  they had the same population shares for 
marital-status-presence-of-children  groups as German women (i.e., mar- 
ried with children,  married  without children, unmarried with  children, 
and unmarried without children). The table shows that the U.S.-German 
difference in labor market attachment would be almost as large in each 
year under this simulation as it actually is. Specifically, 81 to 86 percent 
of  the German advantage in employment rates would  remain.  (Similar 
results are obtained for full-time employment.) Thus family structure is 
Table 3.16  Actual and Hypothetical Employment Rates for Women Aged 18-29 
with Low Educational Levels 
Employment  Full-Time Employment 
German  German 
Year  Actual  Shares  Actual  Shares 
1984 
Germany  ,553  ,553  ,427  ,427 
United States  .353  ,382  ,210  .23  1 
U.S.-German difference  .200  ,171  ,217  ,196 
Germany  .563  .563  .417  ,417 
United States  ,375  ,411  ,232  ,257 
U.S.-German difference  ,188  ,152  .I85  ,160 
1991 
Nofe: Employs German shares for marital-status-presence-of-children  groups. Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West  Germany  151 
not an important factor in producing the German employment advantage, 
at least not in an accounting sense. Thus, even if the welfare system were 
responsible for the entire U.S.-German difference in family structure, its 
effects would be small. 
The results  in  table  3.16 imply  that  the  source of  the  U.S.-German 
differences is located within marital-status-children groups. This could still 
mean that welfare is  important, but not necessarily. As may be seen in 
table 3.14, where data are available, German employment rates are higher 
than American rates even among two groups not eligible for welfare, mar- 
ried and unmarried women without children, and in  1984, this was also 
the case for married women with children. If we restrict the U.S.-German 
comparison entirely to the three groups who are largely not eligible for 
U.S. welfare (i.e., married women with and without children and unmar- 
ried women without children) and use the German shares for these groups 
(to focus on the within-group differences in employment rates), the aver- 
age employment rate for Germany was .522 in 1984; in the United States, 
this simulated rate was only .375. Thus, for welfare-ineligible groups, using 
a fixed-weight average for both countries, Germans were 14.7 percentage 
points more likely to be employed than Americans in  1984. This difference 
is almost as large as the 17.1 percentage point gap in the family-compo- 
sition-corrected  employment  rates  for  the  entire population  of  young 
women with low educational levels shown in table 3.16. This means that 
in  1984 the bulk of the employment rate gap between the United States 
and Germany for less educated young women occurred within groups who 
were not eligible for AFDC in the United States. While unfortunately the 
data do not permit a similar computation for  1991, the results for  1984 
strongly suggest that welfare is not an important cause of the German 
women’s greater attachment to the labor market. 
3.5.3  Parental Leave 
While low real wage offers, less access to public employment, and, to a 
considerably lesser extent, welfare may all potentially reduce young, less 
educated American women’s labor market attachment relative to German 
women’s,  a countervailing  factor  is  Germany’s maternity  and parental 
leave policies. Throughout our period of observation (1 984-91)  Germany 
has had more generous maternity  leave policies than is  the case in  the 
United States. Moreover, in 1986 additional parental leave was mandated 
in Germany, reaching 18 months by 1990, and provisions were adopted to 
require paid parental leave for those working under  19 hours per week. 
As a test of the effect of this law, we compare the impact of children on 
young married mothers’ labor market attachment in the United States and 
Germany for 1984 (before the new law) and 1991. 
The results of this comparison are shown in table 3.17, which contrasts 152  Francine D.  Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.17  Employment by Family Composition and Education for Women Aged 
1%29  Differences 
Married: With Children vs. Without Children 
1984  1991 
Absolute  Divided  Absolute  Divided 
Country  Difference  by  Mean  Difference  by  Mean 
United States (CPS) 
Employment-population  ratio 
Edlow  -.I52  -.431 
Edmid  -.283  -.417 
Edhigh  -  ,256  -  .295 
Edlow  -.I50  -.714 
Edmid  -.316  -  .669 
Edhigh  -.299  -  ,425 
Full-time employment-population ratio 
Germany (GSOEP) 
Employment -populat  ion ratio 
Edlow  -.536  -  ,969 
Edmid  -  ,539  -.812 
Edhigh  -.571  -  ,730 
Edlow  -.614  -  1.438 
Edmid  -.700  -1.217 
Full-time employment-population ratio 
Edhigh  -.683  -1.105 
-.I33 
















-  ,446 
n.a. 
-  ,873 
-.864 
n.a. 
-  1.283 
-.954 
Note: n.a. = cell size equal to 10 or fewer observations. 
employment and full-time employment by  educational group for young 
married women with and without children. In all cases, married women 
with children have lower employment rates than married women without 
children. Further, for each year and educational group, this difference is 
considerably larger for Germany than for the United States, particularly 
for full-time employment. This pattern holds for both absolute differences 
and for differences relative to the mean for the relevant educational group. 
The larger difference in employment rates between married women with 
children and those without children for Germany than for the United 
States likely reflects a variety of factors in addition to Germany’s more 
generous maternity and parental leave policies, including cultural differ- 
ences between the two countries, the need to supply lunches at home for 
schoolchildren in Germany, and the legality of employment discrimination 
against  pregnant  women.  However,  the  parental  leave  system  became 
steadily more generous between 1984 and 1991, whereas the need to pro- 
vide lunches for schoolchildren and the legal situation of pregnant women 
did not change. We do not know what happened to attitudes toward moth- Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  153 
ers working; however, since female participation rates in general increased 
over this period, it is unlikely that these became less favorable. Thus, if the 
effect of children became more negative between  1984 and 1991, an ad- 
verse effect of the policy changes on German women’s employment will 
be suggested. 
The results in table 3.17 indicate that the “effect” of children (i.e., the 
difference in employment rates between mothers and nonmothers) tended 
to rise for Germany, although this pattern is most consistent for employ- 
ment rather than for full-time employment. In contrast these effects stayed 
the same or declined  slightly in  the  United  States.3o  These results  are 
largely confirmed in appendix table 3A.6, which uses the probit analyses 
of tables 3A.  1 and 3A.2 to  examine partial derivatives and semielasticities 
of employment and full-time employment with respect to marriage and 
children. Moreover, in these analyses, which control for other factors (i.e., 
age, age squared, marital status, Edlow, Edmid, and race for the United 
States), the rise in the absolute value of the effect of children (both the 
derivative and the semielasticity) in Germany is larger for full-time em- 
ployment than for overall employment. The larger  impact  on full-time 
work in Germany may well be due to the 19-hour provision enacted into 
the  1986 law,  which strongly discourages full-time work. The results in 
tables 3.17 and 3A.6 thus provide some evidence in support of an impact 
of the German parental leave law. 
These findings serve to highlight the strength of the factors raising the 
employment rates of young, less educated German women relative to simi- 
lar women in the United States. Their higher wages and greater access to 
government employment were strong enough to outweigh the more gener- 
ous German policies for maternity and parental leave, which our results 
suggest did negatively affect German women’s employment behavior in 
the 1980s, as well as other factors including the possibility of legal discrim- 
ination against pregnant women and the lack of school lunch programs 
in Germany. 
3.6  Conclusions 
This paper has examined gender differences in labor market outcomes 
for hard-to-employ youths in the United States and West Germany during 
the 1984-91  period. We find that young, less educated American men and 
especially women are far less likely to be employed than their German 
counterparts.  Moreover,  less  educated  young  women  and men  in  the 
United States have lower earnings relative to more highly educated youths 
30. The declining relative effect of children on women’s labor force participation in the 
United States has been noted in other studies (see, e.g., Leibowitz and Klerman 1995). 154  Francine D.  Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
in their own country and also fare much worse than less educated German 
youths in absolute terms, correcting for purchasing power. At the same 
time, for those in the highest educational group, Americans outearned 
Germans by considerable margins. 
The evidence that young, less educated women in the United States are 
more weakly attached to the labor market than those in Germany is espe- 
cially surprising in light of Germany’s lower labor force participation rates 
for other groups of women and its considerably more generous family and 
maternity leave policies. We present evidence suggesting that all else equal 
these policies do negatively affect the labor force attachment of German 
women, particularly their full-time employment rates. While welfare may 
play a role, our findings suggest that it accounts for very little of the U.S.- 
German difference in employment rates. Employment rates of less edu- 
cated women are also substantially lower in the United States than in Ger- 
many for categories of women who would not be eligible for welfare-in 
particular, for married and unmarried women without children. And most 
of the difference in labor market attachment between less educated young 
German and American women is  accounted for by groups who are not 
eligible for welfare in the United States. This suggests that poor labor mar- 
ket opportunities are more important than our welfare system in explain- 
ing young American women’s lower labor force attachment. 
The relatively high employment rates of less educated German youths 
combined with their relatively high wages, raise the question of how they 
are successfully absorbed into the labor market. One possibility is that 
less educated German youths are more productive than their American 
counterparts. We  lack the data to examine this issue directly; however, 
other evidence suggests that less educated German youths may well have 
higher skills (Nickel1 and Bell 1996) and thus that productivity differences 
could play a role in explaining this pattern. However, given the consider- 
able evidence discussed above that institutions affect wage inequality, we 
believe that productivity differences are unlikely to account fully for the 
extremely large differences that we  have documented between Germany 
and the United States in the wages and employment of hard-to-employ 
youths. 
An alternative explanation that we were able to  explore is that the public 
sector in Germany in effect functions as an employer of last resort, ab- 
sorbing some otherwise unemployable low-skilled youths. Consistent with 
this idea, we  find that while government employment is  selective of the 
highly educated in both the United States and Germany, low education 
has a much larger negative effect on government employment of young 
workers in the United States. Moreover, among German males, the effect 
of low education on government employment is more negative for older 
than for younger workers, supporting the idea that public employment in 
Germany is particularly an outlet for younger, less skilled workers. This Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  155 
makes sense in that they are more likely to be minimum wage constrained. 
While this pattern did not hold consistently among women, it may well be 
that older, less educated  German women  are also minimum  wage con- 
strained. A simple accounting suggests that the effects of the public sector 
on youth employment in Germany could be  large indeed. Public sector 
jobs may well allow the German labor market to absorb the additional 
workers  attracted by high wages for the low skilled, relative to the U.S. 
labor market. This does not require that Germany explicitly pursue a pol- 
icy of utilizing the government  as employer of last resort. The large size 
of the government sector in Germany combined with the composition of 
employment  in government jobs could well  have this effect even in the 
absence of a conscious policy. Appendix 
Table 3A.I  Probit Results for the Determinants of Employment and Full-Time Employment, Ages 18-29 
Germany  United States 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
Exalanatorv 
Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
A. Employment  1984 
White  ,428  .037 
Age  -  .577  ,397  .3  18  ,275  .I07  ,065 
Mar  ,489  .I89  -  ,647  ,131  ,550  ,036 
Childyes  -  ,236  ,150  -  1.049  ,118  -.163  .03  1 
Edlow  -  ,443  ,262  -.321  ,189  -  ,925  ,055 
Edmid  ,126  .220  -.I00  .I66  -.381  ,050 
Constant  7.692  4.736  -2.955  3.292  -.455  ,766 
Agesq  ,012  .008  -  ,005  ,006  -  .002  .001 
N  622 
Log likelihood  -2 10.947  - 
B. Full-time employment 1984 
White 
Age  ,277  ,325 
Agesq  -  ,005  .007 
Mar  ,434  ,157 
Childyes  -  ,256  ,129 





,397  ,035 
,485  .276  .424  ,058 
-.OlO  .006  -  ,007  ,001 
-  ,744  ,125  ,483  ,029 
-1.215  ,115  -.I24  .027 
-.I22  ,185  -  ,476  ,044 
Coefficient  S.E. 
,331  ,033 
.080  ,055 
-  ,001  ,001 
-  ,354  ,026 
-  ,680  .025 
-I  .192  .048 
-  ,461  ,041 
,052  ,656 
14,441 
8,013.24 
. I80  ,033 
,528  .055 
-.010  ,001 
-.197  ,024 
-  ,619  ,024 
-  ,881  ,044 Edmid  ,334  .I77  ,195  .I58  -.I73  ,038  -  ,302  .035 
Constant  -3.455  3.888  -4.857  3.292  -  5.623  ,687  -6.439  ,657 
N  622  716  13,421  14,441 
Log likelihood  -309.091  -363.485  -7,671.28  -8,735.83 
C. Employment 1991 
White  ,359  ,041  .270  ,034 
Age  -  ,048  ,067  .604  .429  .I39  ,072  ,087  ,062 
Mar  ,038  ,027  -  ,675  ,169  ,432  .04  I  -.214  ,028 
Childyes  -  ,022  ,027  -  1.732  ,166  -  ,046  ,036  -  ,662  ,028 
Edlow  -  .074  ,035  -  ,327  ,275  -  1.055  ,063  -  1.235  .05  I 
Edmid  -.038  ,028  ,042  ,236  -  ,498  ,058  -  ,421  ,044 
Constant  1.485  ,820  -5.936  5.238  -.717  ,857  ,018  ,741 
N  473  554  10,926  1 1,924 
Agesq  .oo  1  .oo  1  -.011  ,009  -  ,002  ,002  -  ,001  ,001 
Log likelihood  -  -201.802  -4,376.31  -7,430.67 
D. Full-time employment 1991 
White  .302  ,039  ,120  ,034 
Age  p.213  ,472  ,182  ,435  ,530  .066  .656  .06  I 
Mar  ,043  .213  -  ,723  ,158  ,543  ,036  -  .090  .027 
Childyes  ,117  ,203  -  1.955  ,154  -  ,082  ,033  -  ,650  ,027 
Edlow  -.I27  ,264  -  ,556  .262  -.653  .05 1  -  .928  .046 
Edmid  -  ,060  ,224  -.I35  ,209  -.210  .044  -  .278  ,037 
Constant  1.942  5.673  -  ,328  5.304  -6.709  .786  -7.940  ,737 
N  413  554  10,926  I 1,924 
Agesq  ,007  ,010  -  .004  ,009  -  ,009  .oo I  -  ,012  ,001 
Log likelihood  -187.373  -195.551  -5,702.66  -8,264.56 
Note: S.E. = asymptotic standard error. The employment regression for German men in  1991 is OLS, due to convergence problems. Table 3A.2  Probit Results for the Determinants of Employment and Full-Time Employment, Ages 25-36 
Germany  United States 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
Explanatory 
Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
A. Employment  1984 
White  ,355  ,039  ,028  .03  1 
Age  ,456  ,425  ,121  ,276  -.I07  ,083  -  ,020  .06  1 
Mar  ,601  ,197  -.364  ,125  .546  ,040  -  ,275  ,026 
Childyes  -  ,285  ,196  -  1.303  ,131  -  .037  ,040  -  ,704  .028 
Edlow  -  ,725  ,242  -  .320  ,154  -1.111  ,049  -  ,974  .037 
Edmid  -  ,053  ,187  ,077  .I31  -  ,543  ,042  -.324  ,029 
Constant  -5.897  6.43  1  -  .775  4.190  2.646  1.246  1.460  .92  I 
N  820  898  15,343  16,400 
Log likelihood  -  169,496  -51 2.271  -4,823.43  -9,526.76 
Agesq  -  ,007  ,007  -  ,002  ,005  .002  ,001  ,001  .oo 1 
B. Full-time employment  1984 
White  ,358  .035  -.I37  ,030 
Age  ,181  ,320  -  ,030  ,300  ,073  ,070  .06  1  ,059 
Mar  ,406  ,145  -.569  .I 19  ,476  ,033  -  .322  ,024 
Childyes  -  .225  ,142  -  1.484  .I 19  -.010  ,033  -.781  ,025 
Edlow  -  .233  .  I 84  -.I36  ,171  -  ,804  ,040  -.819  ,037 
Edmid  ,455  .I21  ,154  ,137  -  ,357  .03  1  -  ,276  ,026 
Constant  -2.003  4.885  1.839  4.543  ,738  3.167  ,033  ,895 
N  820  898  15,343  16,400 
Agesq  -  ,003  .005  -  .00005  ,005  -  ,001  .oo  1  -.001  .oo  1 
Log likelihood  -  349.708  -399.363  -  7,069.55  -  10,073.8 C. Employment 1991 
White 
Age  ,719 
Mar  ,393 
Childyes  -.071 
Edlow  p.516 
Edmid  -  .079 
Constant  -9.176 
Agesq  -.012 
N  696 
Log likelihood  -108.36 
D. Full-time employment 1991 
White 
Age  ,466 
Agesq  -  .007 
Mar  ,076 
Childyes  ,043 
Edlow  -  ,346 
Edmid  ,020 
Constant  -5.897 
N  696 
















-  ,003 
-  ,434 






























-  ,062 
.oo  I 
,459 
,029 









-  ,0004 
























-  ,099 
-  .640 
-  1.035 









-  ,888 




.03  1 
,065 














Note: S.E. = asymptotic standard error. Table 3A.3  Partial Derivatives and Semielasticities of  Employment Probabilities with Respect to Education 
Partial Derivative  Semielasticity 
I984  1991  1984  1991 
Country  Edlow  Edmid  Edlow  Edmid  Edlow  Edmid  Edlow  Edmid 











-  ,037 



























-  ,256 
(.015) 






















-  ,277 
(.017) 
(.028) 





















































































-  ,428 
(.OW 



































-  ,238 
























Note: Based on coefficients from tables 3A.1 and 3A.2. Derivatives are evaluated at the sample mean of the dependent variable. The semielasticity is defined 
as the derivative divided by  the sample mean. Other explanatory variables include age, age squared, marital status (Mar), presence of children (Childyes), 
and for the United States a race dummy (White). Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Table 3A.4  Average School Attendance, Educational Attainment, Employment, 
and Log Wages for Immigrants in Germany Aged 18-29 
Sample 
I984  1991 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
A. All immigrants 
In school 
German technical or high school degrees 
German postsecondary degrees 
Vocational/university degrees outside 
N (including the nonemployed) 
German technical or high school degrees 
German postsecondary degrees 
Vocational/university degrees outside 
Employed 
Full-time employed 
Log hours-corrected earnings among 
N (including the nonemployed) 
C. Individuals not in school and without 
German technical, high school, or 
postsecondary degrees 
Vocational/university degrees outside 
Employed 
Full-time employed 
Log hours-corrected earnings among 
N (including the nonemployed) 
D.  Individuals not in school, without 
German technical, high school, or 
postsecondary degrees, and without 
vocationaYuniversity degrees outside 
Germany 








Log hours-corrected earnings among 


















































.222  .119  ,132  ,072 
.830  ,400  ,848  ,376 
.778  ,314  ,835  ,276 
6.882  6.607  6.952  6.770 
213  293  158  181 
,824  ,403  ,854  ,381 
,782  ,318  ,839  ,280 
6.879  6.602  6.934  6.770 
165  258  137  168 
Note; Native earnings equations were used to simulate hours-corrected earnings for immi- 
grants. Table 3A.5  Partial Derivatives and Semielasticities of Government Employment 
Probabilities with Respect to Edlow and Edmid 
Gender 
Ages 18-29  Ages 30-65 
Edlow  Edmid  Edlow  Edmid 
A. Derivatives 
Men 
1984  United States  -.095  -  ,063  -.I71  -.i08 
(.010)  (.007)  (.008)  (.005) 
Germany  .oo 1  -.008  -.208  -.110 
(.068)  (.039)  (.022) 
1991  United States  -.I76  -.043  -.I81  -  ,079 
(.015)  (.009)  (.008)  (.005) 
(.067)  (.050)  (.052)  (.025) 
Germany  -.025  -.032  -.I79  -.070 
Women 
1984  United States  -.230  -.I30  -.376  -  ,247 
(.018)  (.009)  (.011)  (.007) 
(.072)  (.053)  (.@43)  (.039) 
(.018)  (.009)  (.01  I)  (.006) 
(.083)  (.062)  (.047)  (.  040) 
Germany  -.I65  -.I72  -.283  -.291 
1991  United States  -  ,200  -.I03  -.320  -.198 
Germany  -  ,009  -  ,026  -.237  -.241 
B. Semielasticities 
Men 
1984  United States 
Germany 
1991  United States 
Germany 
Women 
1984  United States 
Germany 
1991  United States 
Germany 





























-  .644 
-  ,902 
-.096 
-  1.025 
(.045) 



























-  ,773 
(.128) 
-1.034 
Note: Based on a probit model controlling for age, age squared, marital status (Mar), pres- 
ence of children (Childyes), Edlow, Edmid, and for the United States, a race dummy (White), 
estimated among those with jobs. Derivatives are evaluated at the sample mean of the depen- 
dent variable. The semielasticity is defined as the derivative divided by  the sample mean. 
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Table 3A.6  Partial Derivatives and Semielasticities of Employment Probabilities with Respect to Marriage and Presence of Children for Women 
Employment Probability  Full-Time Employment Probability 
1984  1991  1984  1991 
Presence of  Presence of  Presence of  Presence of 
Children  Marriage  Age Group  Marriage  Children  Marriage  Children  Marriage  Children 
A. Derivatives 
Ages 18-29 
Germany  -  ,237 




Germany  -.I43 
(.049) 








-  .26  I 
(.010) 
-.227  -.583 
(.076)  (.056) 
-  ,076  -  ,235 
(.010)  (.OIO) 
-.I62  -  ,558 
(.051)  (.053) 
(.009)  (.009) 
-  ,034  -  .223 








-.481  -  .282 
(.046)  (.062) 
-  ,269  -  ,036 
(.010)  (.011) 
-  ,442  -.279 
(.042)  (.061) 
(.OlO)  (.009) 
-.311  -  ,076 
-  .763 
(.060) 
-  .259 
(.011) 
-  ,754 
(.059) 
-  ,280 
(.010) 
B.  Semielasticities 
Ages 18-29 
Germany  -  ,360 
(.073) 
United States  -  .204 
(.015) 









-  ,902 
(.091) 
(.016) 
-  ,402 
-.316 
(.I 11) 








-  ,343 
(.015) 










-  ,265 
(.020) 
-  ,874  -  .484 
(.083)  (.106) 
-.589  -.071 
(.021)  (.021) 
-  1.326  -.701 
(.126)  (.153) 
(.021)  (.017) 
-  .643  -.141 








Note: Based on coefficients from tables 3A.I and 3A.2. Derivatives are evaluated at sample means of the dependent variable. The semielasticity is defined 
as the derivative divided  by  the sample mean. Other explanatory variables include age, age  squared, Edlow,  Edmid, and for the United  States a race 
dummy (White). Gender and Youth Employment: The United States and West Germany  165 
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